Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 9

2009

Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be Expected—More
Must Be Done
John E. Tyler III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be Expected—More Must Be Done, 10 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/9

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

TYLER JE. ADVANCING UNIVERSITY INNOVATION: MORE MUST BE EXPECTED-MORE
MUST BE DONE. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(1):143-212.

Advancing University Innovation: More Must Be
Expected—More Must Be Done
John E. Tyler III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Far too much otherwise usable university research fails to
find its way to advanced stages of research, commercial
products, or other uses.1 Given the fundamental nature of
much university research, a certain amount of this research
will appropriately reach its potential with publication and
© 2009 John E. Tyler III.
* John E. Tyler III is the General Counsel and Secretary for the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation. He is also the Chair of the Board for the Kauffman
Innovation Network, Inc., a 501(c)(3) organization begun as an outgrowth of
the Foundation’s support of university efforts to advance university
innovation. Among other things, KIN operates the iBridgeSM Network and Site
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Institute of Science, and at Howard Hughes Medical Institute. The author is
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those from the University of Minnesota Law School who read, commented on,
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1. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OF FEDERALLY FUNDED
R&D: FINDINGS AND PROPOSED ACTIONS 7 (May 13, 2003) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003] (“[T]here is much technology resident in both
sectors [university and industry] that is never commercialized.”); RICHARD
LAMBERT & NICK BUTLER, THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES:
RENAISSANCE OR DECAY? 16, 55–56 (2006); Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global
Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 209, 214 (2004)
(“Unfortunately, in some cases, scientific discoveries were left unused and
unapplied.”); Marie C. Thursby, Introducing Technology Entrepreneurship to
Graduate
Education:
An
Integrative
Approach,
in
UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211, 214 (Gary C. Libecap ed., 2005) (“[O]nly a
fraction of inventions with commercial potential are disclosed.”); see also
WENDY H. SCHACHT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: USE OF FEDERALLY FUNDED
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 11–17 (CRS Report for Congress, RL33527,
July 19, 2007) [hereinafter SCHACHT, 33527] (arguing that the use of federal
R&D results has remained restrained).
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classroom instruction, but a substantial volume of these
innovations instead deserves life in products, services, research
tools and methodologies, and other uses.
Unfortunately,
exploitation of university innovations does not seem to be what
it could be and is significantly below its potential for evolving to
later stages of research, advancing human welfare, and
spurring economic growth. Of course, there are success stories
that should be celebrated, but when measured against potential
and opportunity, much more must be expected from and more
must be done by industry, government, universities, and their
respective leaders.
Congress has declared and reiterated that our country’s
federal policy shall be to support and pursue the usefulness of
the fruits of research conducted using federal money, including
through increased collaboration between and among industry,
universities, and government.2 Congress has expressly stated
2. See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §
3701(3) (2006) (“Cooperation among academia, Federal laboratories, labor, and
industry, in such forms as technology transfer, personnel exchange, joint
research projects, and others, should be renewed, expanded, and
strengthened.”); 15 U.S.C. § 3701(8) (stating that there is a need for a
comprehensive national policy to enhance technology transfer for commercial
and public purposes, “including a strong national policy supporting domestic
technology transfer and utilization of the science and technology resources of
the Federal Government”); Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (University and Small
Business Patent Procedure Act of 1980), 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006) (amending the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980); 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3)
(stating the purpose of this chapter is ”to advance, through cooperative efforts
among industries, universities, and government laboratories, promising
research and development projects, which can be optimized by the private
sector for commercial and industrial applications . . . .”) (referring to the
National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (1996)); Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement
(CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub.L.No. 108-453 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) to
address joint research agreements); Technology Transfer Commercialization
Act of 2000, Pub.L.No. 106-404, § 2(1) (amending the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act of 1980) (“[T]he importance of linking our
unparalleled network of over 700 Federal laboratories and our Nation’s
universities with United States industry continues to hold great promise for
our future economic prosperity.”).
Wendy Schacht, who researches and writes for the Congressional Research
Service, has discussed these and other federal statutes as they relate to
federal policy and advancing innovation. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, THE BAYHDOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION
OF TECHNOLOGY 7–8 (CRS Report for Congress, RL32076, Oct. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter SCHACHT, 32076]; WENDY H. SCHACHT, INDUSTRIAL
COMPETITIVENESS AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT: DEBATE OVER
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that “[i]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to ensure the full use of the results of the Nation’s
Federal investment in research and development.”3
Historically, this policy applied most directly to research by
federal laboratories involving military, energy, and space
applications.4 More recently, the focus has broadened to
embrace maximizing results of research that contributes to or
can result in economic growth and advances in human welfare,
beyond consumer-oriented derivatives of military, defense, and
space technologies.5 The focus also has expanded to include
universities and other institutions that receive federal research
grants. The most significant of the federal policy declarations
in this regard is the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.6
As stated in the Act, among the reasons Congress passed
Bayh-Dole were “to promote the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research and development”
and to ensure “the public availability of inventions made in the
GOVERNMENT POLICY 5-16 (CRS Report for Congress, RL33528 Aug. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter SCHACHT, 33528]; WENDY H. SCHACHT, PATENT OWNERSHIP AND
FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D): A DISCUSSION ON THE BAYHDOLE ACT AND THE STEVENSON-WYDLER ACT (CRS Report for Congress,
RL30320, Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter SCHACHT, 30320];
SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 11–17.
In addition, numerous states and local communities have been focusing on the
economic development potential that can arise from properly exploiting the
results of university-based research. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701(9) (“It is in the
national interest to promote the adaption of technological innovations to State
and local government uses.”); 15 U.S.C. § 3702(3) (stating the Act’s purposes
includes “stimulating improved utilization of federally funded technology
developments . . . by State and local governments and the private sector . . . .”);
SCHACHT, 32076, supra, at 4–5; see also JERRY PAYTAS ET AL., UNIVERSITIES
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY CLUSTERS (2004); LOUIS G. TORNATZKY
ET AL., INNOVATION U.: NEW UNIVERSITY ROLES IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
(2002); DIANE PALMINTERA, ACCELERATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2005); W.R. Coffman, et al.,
The Future of Technology Transfer at a Major Land Grant University: Report
of the Cornell University Land Grant Panel on Technology Transfer, 6 IP
STRATEGY TODAY 1, 3–7 (2003).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a)(1) (2000).
4. SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 6–7 (“[W]hile the major portion of
total federal R&D spending has been in the defense arena, governmentfinanced work has led or contributed to new commercial products and
processes, including, but not limited to, antibiotics, plastics, jet aircraft,
computers, electronics, and genetically engineered drugs (e.g., insulin and
human growth hormone).”); see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 2.
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701(3), (8), (9); 15 U.S.C. §
3702(3); 15 U.S.C. § 3710; 35 U.S.C. § 200.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
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United States . . . .”7 Congress believed that these goals could
be achieved most effectively by changing federal policy to
uniformly allow institutions receiving federal research grants
to own the resulting inventions and innovations, license them
to others (even exclusively except for the general government
license), generate revenue, and share the revenue with the
researchers.8
Prior to passage of the Act, there were twenty-six different
federal agency policies about using the results of federally
funded research.9 After the Act, there was one federal policy.10
Consequently, responsibility for the results of federally funded
research formally devolved from federal agencies to universities
with a corresponding Congressional mandate to maximize the
usefulness of such research results. Certain universities have
done well in fulfilling their duties, but many others could do

7. Id.:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system
to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development; to encourage maximum
participation of small business firms in federally supported research
and development efforts; to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit
organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering
future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the United States by United
States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs
of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or
unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of
administering policies in this area.
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202(a), 202(c)(1)-(3), 202(c)(7)(B).
9. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at.2; see also SCHACHT, 30320, supra
note 2, at 4.
10. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 2; SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at
4 (The intent of the Bayh-Dole Act is to create “a single uniform national
policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and encourage private industry to
utilize government funded inventions through the commitment of the risk
capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of commercial
application.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980)); see also Sara
Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Developing
Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 278 (2006); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of
Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1374,
1437 (2007) (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act standardized rules regarding
ownership of intellectual property and was a clear improvement over the prior
set of complex, non-uniform rules).
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better or have not done so well.11
Universities that seem to have been successful in
advancing their innovations, whether before Bayh-Dole or after
its enactment, have deployed different strategies and tactics for
doing so, and there is much to be learned from their
experiences and examples. Contrary to what some appear to
believe, the most important lessons from these universities are
not necessarily to replicate their tactics. Instead, the best
lessons are those based on common characteristics these
universities have in pursuing their advancing innovation
efforts and, in the process, furthering federal policy. Among the
characteristics these universities have in common are the
following:
a. an informed, realistic vision for using and advancing
university innovation in ways that complement specific
academic and research missions, beyond merely chasing
revenue;12
b. policies consistent with that vision and in furtherance of
the Act’s broad mandates;13 and
11. Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship and University-Based
Technology Transfer, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 241 (2005) (discussing certain
university technology transfer offices and evaluating their effectiveness); see
also infra notes 12–19 and accompanying text about the revenue universities
receive from advancing innovation activities, amounts spent on research, and
ratios of spending per disclosure, new patent application, and patent issued.
12. As discussed below, such a vision should reflect the university’s
knowledge of its specific research strengths, personnel, and resources. The
vision should also ensure that advancing innovation appropriately
complements the university’s core missions of teaching and research and does
not sacrifice general service to human welfare and economic growth, which
requires a realistic perspective on the role of revenue. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, UNIVERSITY-PRIVATE
SECTOR RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INNOVATION ECONOMY 69
(November 20, 2008) [hereafter PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008] (regarding
university-industry relationships, the Council determined that “[h]aving a
clear vision from leadership . . . in developing and maintaining the
partnership is vital for success” and a key element or guiding principle
common among successful university-industry collaborations is a “shared
vision and clear expectations”).
13. This point is developed further below, but examples might include
policies that permit different approaches to intellectual property ownership,
use rights, and revenue; that allow for different approaches to risk allocation,
including to the university, by addressing representations, warranties and
indemnification in light of respective benefits to be gained, investments,
ability to control, and overall exposure to downside losses. See Michael M.
Crow, Building an Entrepreneurial University, in MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE
AND EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF THE RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY: MEETING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, at 27
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c. behaviors that advance the universities’ innovations by
pursuing that vision and implementing those policies.14
Unlike other articles about Bayh-Dole or advancing
university innovation,15 this article explores the links that
should connect federal policy with the university’s vision and
the corresponding policies which in turn should be realized
through related practices and behaviors. The absence or
weakness of these links contribute to the unrealized potential
of university innovations and are a reflection of how university
leaders and their advisors have pursued or neglected federal
policy and responsibilities under it.16
(2008) (explaining that Arizona State University has implemented policies
that promote entrepreneurship and simplify moving “ideas into action” and
that the University has “minimized” policies that discourage entrepreneurial
behavior).
14. The following examples of behaviors that a university might consider,
depending on its unique circumstances, are discussed in more depth below:
factoring efforts to advance innovation (e.g., disclosures) in tenure decisions;
measuring the success of innovations in terms other than purely economic;
pursuing volume in the amount of knowledge advanced rather than income
derived; or encouraging equity interests instead of licensing fees that may
hamstring a developing organization’s cash flow.
15. There can be confusion about the terms “advancing innovation” and
“technology transfer.” Some people use “technology transfer” to refer more
specifically to efforts to commercialize and the results of those efforts,
frequently through patenting and licensing. Somewhat more broadly, others
recognize that “technology transfer” may also encompass publication and other
knowledge exchange media. In either of the latter contexts, “technology
transfer” would be a subset of “advancing innovation” but the words are not
synonymous. “Advancing innovation” seems to better reflect the broad
mandate from Congress that universities maximize the usefulness of their
innovations, not just commercialization of them (although commercialization
should not be condemned or forgotten in the right circumstances).
In the body of this article and narrative parts of the footnotes, I try to use
“advancing innovation” to refer to the processes and strategies by which
universities maximize the usefulness of the innovations, including but not
limited to commercialization activities, that result from their researchers’
efforts in furtherance of the broader, fullest purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act. In
parenthetical references in the footnotes, I use “technology transfer” more
frequently because the authors cited use those words more often, and it can be
difficult to discern whether the authors intend the words to mean
commercialization, knowledge transfer, or Bayh-Dole’s broader purposes.
Changing the author’s terminology in summarizing their points could be
confusing and potentially distort their intended meaning.
16. Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What
We Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320, 320 (2006) (“[N]egative
consequences of Bayh-Dole can be traced to the institutional policies
structured to optimize institutional benefits and income, rather than to the
Act itself.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28
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This article first presents a context for university leaders
and their advisors to appreciate the importance of universities
advancing their innovations as a vital matter of national
interest, fulfilling an essential role in the new economy, and
providing material educational benefits. This section also
discusses the reasons some posit to oppose advancing
innovation, most notably the inevitable conflicts of interest and
other ethical concerns that arise from university engagement
with industry, which is inherent in advancing innovation
activities. Finally, the first section concludes with perspectives
on ways to manage ethical matters, which Congress must have
intended by promulgating federal policy that mandates
university-industry interaction.
The article next summarizes debate about the Bayh-Dole
Act’s effectiveness as federal policy and why some mistakenly
attribute failures in advancing innovation to the Act instead of
to how the Act has been implemented by university leaders and
policy makers. The article then considers the importance of a
customized institutional vision for advancing innovation that
complements academic and research missions, is informed by
knowledge of the specific university itself, and reflects a proper
perspective on revenue potential and risk allocation. Finally,
the article concludes by relating how that unique vision should
consistently inform university policies and behaviors regarding
such legal and practical topics as intellectual property
strategies, allocating liability, invention disclosures, and
measures of success.
It would be naïve to suggest that inadequacy of results in
advancing university innovation rests wholly with universities
or how leaders and their advisors steward such efforts.
Industry is not without responsibility. Other factors also
contribute—most notably the lack of available funds. For
example, research suggests that capital is inadequate to bridge
the “valley of death” for many potential products and otherwise
useful
innovations
at
intermediate
stages
of
the
(“successful technology transfer negotiations often depend on individual
efforts, particularly those of the leadership, from each organization having a
strong desire to establish partnerships”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra
note 12, at 29 (negotiations could be shorter and less time consuming “if a few
key factors were present, such as continued commitment from leadership”);
Crow, supra note 13, at 26–27 (“Many universities have a wide range of such
constraints [on entrepreneurial behavior]—the kinds of policies that can
inhibit decision-making, deaden creative thinking, and turn deans into paperpushers.”).
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commercialization process.17 Industry behavior, the valley of
death, and other factors that inhibit whether and how
university innovations advance should not interfere with efforts
to scrutinize and encourage change in university approaches,
including by expanding vision to correspond to the broad
purposes of Bayh-Dole and implementing corresponding
policies and behaviors beyond hoped for financial gains.
This article focuses on certain factors within the control of
university leaders and their advisors, many of whom are from
the legal profession, and should not be construed as forgiving or
ignoring the need to address other factors that interfere with
advancing university innovations to their potential. The focus
on university leaders and their advisors is intended to facilitate
fulfillment of their responsibilities under federal policy and as
stewards of federal grant dollars, hopefully resulting in fewer
orphaned innovations, better opportunities for economic
growth, and expanded human welfare.
II. CONTEXT FOR ADVANCING UNIVERSITY
INNOVATION
The more traditional roles of universities in teaching and
basic research are critical means by which universities advance
knowledge, pursue innovation, and contribute to the well-being
of society, and this article is not intended to detract from the
Instead, this article
importance of those contributions.18
17. See, e.g., GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., A VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE
INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION 1 (2007); Phillip
Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas:
Financing the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States, 28 J.
TECH. TRANSFER 227 (2003); Charles W. Wessner, Driving Innovations Across
the Valley of Death, 48 RES. TECH. MGT. 9 (2005).
18. See CREST OMC EXPERT GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLICLY FUNDED
RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS AND INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
TRAINING 26 (2006) [hereinafter CREST REPORT], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/crestreport.pdf; see also
Mark Crowell, The Changing Face of University Technology Transfer, in
EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION
THOUGHTBOOK 2005, at 108 (2005) (roles of university are teaching, research,
public service, and economic development); ANNA S. NILSSON ET AL.,
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA 11 (2006),
available
at
http://www.itps.se/Archive/Documents/Swedish/Publikationer/Rapporter/Allm
%E4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf (primary missions of universities to
“create and disseminate knowledge by teaching and performing research” but
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focuses more specifically on university service and
responsibility in light of the purposes stated in the Bayh-Dole
Act. Before delving more deeply into a discussion about how
universities implement the Act, it is important to understand
the context in which university undertake efforts to advance
their innovations.
This section discusses the role of advancing innovation in
the new economy and the importance of that role as a matter of
our nation’s economic and human welfare. This section also
identifies educational benefits gained from university efforts in
this regard. Finally, this section presents the primary positions
against advancing innovation and a rebuttal that managing
ethical problems, rather than capitulating to them or isolating
oneself from them, can simultaneously protect academic
integrity and ensure that innovations are utilized.
A. NEW ECONOMY AND NEW IMPORTANCE FOR UNIVERSITY
INNOVATIONS
Innovations derived from universities, hospitals, and
research institutions—referred to collectively in this article as
“universities”—have transformed our communities, nation, and
our world in exciting and fulfilling ways. Although university
innovations have contributed much to economic opportunity
and human welfare over the past century,19 the outcomes often
have been byproducts of an alternative purpose, such as
military defense or space exploration. A new reality has
evolved in recent decades in which universities pursuing their
research missions are now positioned to catalyze innovation
and economic growth and improve the human condition.20 This
also contribute to innovation process through education and training, adding
to stock of codified knowledge, increase local capacity for problem solving, and
provide public space for conversations on development pathways and new
knowledge).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701(2) (“Technology and industrial innovation offer
an improved standard of living, increased public and private sector
productivity, creation of new industries and employment opportunities,
improved public services and enhanced competitiveness of United States
products in world markets.”); SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 9 (Technology
transfer “can generate economic growth in the form of new jobs, [and] greater
productivity.”); DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 12–13, 15–19 (2004).
20. See LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1, at 15 (noting how universities
should not be managed to improve use of resources); see also Thursby, supra
note 1, at 212 (“University discoveries and inventions are increasingly
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university role has gained significance as large corporations
have jettisoned or changed the foci of their internal
laboratories.21
Wendy Schacht, a member of the Congressional Research
Service who has written extensively for Congress on advancing
university innovation, characterizes federal research and
development grant money as serving a “critical national need”22
and being “vital to the nation’s welfare and security”23 because
of the economic growth derived from the commercialization of
the results of federally funded research.24 Moreover, she
becoming the engine of entrepreneurship and technological advance for startups and established companies.”); G. Pascal Zachary, Corporate Labs
Disappear. Academia Steps In., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at §3; cf. 15 U.S.C.
§ 3701(3) (“Many new discoveries and advances in science occur in universities
and Federal laboratories.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note
12, at 1 (“[u]niversities continue to serve as a primary engine for discovery
research that can lead to innovation”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note
12, at 5, 7 (strengthening and expanding university-private sector
relationships is “vital” to continued innovation and the “health of U.S.
[research and development], and ultimately to the technology-based
economy”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 37 (such
relationships “are one vital element of the U.S. innovation ecosystem” and is
increasingly important in light of “long-term Federal funding trends and
increased global competition”); Crow, supra note 13, at 11 (the roughly 150
public and private “research extensive” universities” are “the institutions that
increasingly fuel the national economy by producing leaders in all sectors of
academia, business, industry, and government, and through perpetual
innovation in products and processes”); Crow, supra note 13, at 18 (higher
education “is the source of economic growth and advances in our society. Our
colleges and universities play a key role in ensuring that, as a nation, we will
continue to lead the world in innovation, maintain our competitive advantage,
and weave the fabric of economic prosperity.”).
21. See David Rotman, Special Report: R &D ‘04: Technology Review’s
Annual Look At Corporate Research Trends And Numbers Including The R &D
Spending Of 150 Top Technology Companies, Plus Profiles Of Three Hot
Research Project, in TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2004), available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/13988/?a=f; The Rise and Fall of
Corporate
R&D,
ECONOMIST,
Mar.
1,
2007,
available
at
http://globaltechforum.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=rich_story&doc_id=10225&tit
le=The+rise+and+fall+of+corporate+R%26D&categoryid=15&channelid=5; see
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1 (noting trend of industry
to reduce basic research, “notably the disappearance of Bell Labs”);
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 5 (reduced number and size of
industry labs forces more reliance on academic and government labs for basic
research output).
22. SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 7.
23. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 3.
24. SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 7; SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at
3; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 5; see also Crow, supra note
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asserts that “[n]ational security is now being redefined to
include economic well-being in addition to weapons
superiority.”25
The economic model that existed previously in the United
States and much of the developed world was driven by a
triumvirate of government, big business, and unions focused on
industrial or manufacturing activities.26 The United States,
European Union, India, parts of Asia, and elsewhere, however,
have moved into a different economic dynamic. In the new,
entrepreneurial economy of the United States and elsewhere,
universities and entrepreneurs have joined government and big
business as the key players, and knowledge and service are the
essential ingredients.27 In this new paradigm, university
research and its potential contribute to advancing quality of life
through the development of new products and services, new
ways of providing services, new approaches to productivity and
efficiency, new jobs, and new sources of capital.28
Federal policy and duty to society obligate research
universities to maximize the potential for their innovations
because they are integral to the new economy. They should
fulfill that obligation in a way that reflects the new,
entrepreneurial economy. To the extent vestiges of the old
economy and its linear processes and measures remain in
university
policies
and
practices,
opportunities
for
13, at 30 (“It is essential to realize that continued economic growth depends
upon innovation and that the global economy operates according to the forces
of ‘creative destruction,’ described by economist Joseph Schumpeter nearly a
century ago.”).
25. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 15; see also Crow, supra note 13, at
30 (“It is incumbent on universities as never before to help solve the pressing
global issues of our time: population growth, climate change, national and
international security.”).
26. See TORNATZKY ET AL., supra, note 2; CARL J. SCHRAMM, THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL IMPERATIVE 24 (2006).
27. See David B. Audretsch et al., The Knowledge Spillover Theory of
Entrepreneurship
and
Technological
Diffusion,
in
UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69, 84 (Gary C. Libecap ed. 2005) (distinguishing
neoclassical tradition focus on investment in physical capital from the
endogenous growth theory focused on accumulated knowledge or knowledge
capital).
28. See SCHACHT, 33528, supra note 2, at 2; see also supra note 16 and
accompanying text; cf. SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 152 (“Our economic
growth depends more and more on the success of our research institutions.
Constant innovation and the entropic expansion of knowledge place enormous
demands on universities.”).
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contributions to economic growth, human welfare, and other
benefits are likely to be imperiled.
B. EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCING UNIVERSITY
INNOVATION
People frequently consider money as the primary benefit to
a university that advances its innovations, but money may be
among the least important. Yes, revenue is available from
royalties, license fees, equity positions and options, and
sponsored research. In addition, success and good experiences
can increase donations from alumni and others associated with
the university experience, which can enhance labs, facilities,
equipment, endowed chairs, and more.29 However, there are
direct benefits to the university’s core academic mission, too.
Evidence suggests that when universities engage well with
business and strive to maximize their innovation potential,
faculty, students, and the university itself can experience
profound educational benefits.30
For faculty, the experience of engaging with industry while
advancing innovations can enhance professional development
and lead to coaching or mentoring relationships and other
experiences that benefit them in the lab and the classroom.31
29. See PALMINTERA, supra, note 2 (Among the ways industry can help
universities are by funding laboratories and equipment, sponsoring research,
endowing chairs, serving on advisory boards, mentoring researchers and
students, providing opportunities for student interns and CEO-in-residence
program; moreover, these interactions and exchanges facilitate the flow of
information between academia and the so called “real world,” thereby
strengthening both; industry benefits by increased access to innovation,
students, employees, and knowledge.); see also Donald Siegel et al., Assessing
the Impact of Organizational Practices on the Productivity of University
Technology Transfer Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 RESEARCH POL’Y 27,
31(2003) [hereinafter Siegel Study]; Markman et al., supra note 11, at 255;
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71.
30. David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology
Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else? in
Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and Technology Transfer,
University of Arizona 1 (2005); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note
1, at 14; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4–5; Donald Siegel et al.,
Commercial Knowledge Transfers from Universities to Firms: Improving the
Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J. HIGH TECH. MGMT.
RES. 111, 130 (2003); Siepmann, supra note 1, at 233.
31. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6–7 (2004); COUNCIL ON
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN U.S. RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES: DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS 3 (2000); Donald Siegel et al.,
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In the lab, researcher interactions with business might help
them keep current with or get ahead of trends and recognize
new, different opportunities for their existing or future
research or its results.32 Researchers and faculty also might
better
understand
valuation,
development,
and
In the classroom and as
commercialization processes.33
advisors, such faculty might have more credibility, be able to
relate more tangibly to their students’ work aspirations, and
provide a better window into real world content applications
and processes.
For students, hands-on research opportunities increase
knowledge and marketability. Working with professors who
have commercialized innovations can improve what and how
the students learn and can open doors for internships,
fellowships, advanced education, and jobs—all of which also
benefit industry and our society.34
These interactions, between universities and industry, also
contribute to the mutually beneficial social networks that
facilitate research collaborations, shared ideas, healthy debate,

Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from
Academicians
to
Practitioners:
Qualitative
Evidence
from
the
Commercialization of University Technologies, 21 J. ENGINEERING & TECH.
MGMT. 115, 119 (2004); Audretsch, supra note 27; Markman et al., supra note
11, at 255; Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of
Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and
Selected University Policies, 27 J.C. & U.L. 775, 786 (2001) (quoting A. Bartlett
Giamatti); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 61 (faculty
can gain a better understanding of industry needs and the applications of their
research); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (increases faculty
professional development and better educates students through “faculty who
can share these experiences” from interacting with industry).
32. Siegel, supra note 31, at 29–30; see also COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, supra note 31, at 16; Siegel, supra note 30, at 130; PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (allows faculty research directions to be on
the leading edge).
33. PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 12.
34. COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 31, at 15–16; see
also LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1, at 57; PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at
12; TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 14; Gary Libecap, Introduction, in
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS,
DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ix (Gary Libecap ed., 2005); Siepmann,
supra note 1, at 233; Zachary, supra note 20; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
2008, supra note 12, at 61 (students have the opportunity to conduct research
“highly relevant” to industry and to experience the “real world”); PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 71 (leads to internships and employment
opportunities and industry personnel can provide assistance with student
projects, serve on thesis committees, and guest lecture).
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and constructive friction.35 These interactions allow for the
direct flow of ideas from the university to business and vice
versa across a wide range of disciplines and the full panoply of
basic to applied research.36 As Laszlo Barbási’s research at the
University of Notre Dame suggests, this flow of ideas within
and across networks and along their nodes frequently forms the
genesis of new opportunities and perspectives, particularly
when such flow is across nodes and networks that might lack
Andrew Hargadon at the
familiarity with each other.37
University of California-Davis points out that ideas bridging
worlds promote innovation.38
Moreover, university-business relationships can enhance
the university’s reputation, thereby allowing it to recruit higher
quality faculty, who attract more research funding that yields
advances in research and results, which perpetuates a cycle—
all to the benefit of faculty, students, and the university.39
35. ANNA S. NILSSON ET AL., COMMERCIALIZATION OF LIFE-SCIENCE
RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA 17
(2006),
available
at
http://www.itps.se/Archive/Documents/Swedish/Publikationer/Rapporter/Allm
%E4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf ; Siegel, supra note 30, at 126; see
also Andrew Nelson & Thomas Byers, Organizational Modularity and IntraUniversity Relationships Between Entrepreneurship Education and Technology
Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 275 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005)
(describing that networks between entrepreneurship education and the
engineering schools are critical and foster technology transfer and
entrepreneurship); Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the
Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for
Entrepreneurship Education, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 28
(Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that ties between star scientists and firm
scientists have a positive effect on technology transfer).
36. Siegel, supra note 30, at 130.
37. ALBERT- LÁSZLÓ BARBÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 43, 61, 212 (2003); see also NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35
(finding that interaction between research and market actors helps to develop
discovery); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 255 (“[T]he frequent engagement
with the university’s scientists to advance the technology can lead to
substantial knowledge spillover effects.”).
38. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Understanding the Innovation
Process: The Power of Social Networks, An Interview with Andrew Hargadon,
in KAUFFMAN THOUGHTBOOK 2005, 122 (2005); Audretsch et al., supra note
27, at 84 (explaining the importance of social capital and social networks in
generating economic growth).
39. See Libecap, supra note 34, at ix; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008,
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However, there are those who contend that the university’s
reputation and scientific integrity suffer because of ethical
problems associated with university efforts to advance
innovations.40
C. ETHICAL OPPOSITION TO ADVANCING INNOVATION
Those who oppose advancing university innovation contend
that university collaboration with industry compromises
academic freedom and research integrity, which creates a
downward spiral of destruction instead of a virtuous cycle of
advancement.41 It is important to understand these divergent
views to counter them when suspect and address them when
valid. Additionally, since a federal policy that extols utilization
of research results implicitly requires the results and processes
by which they were achieved be and appear to be credible and
reliable,42 it is incumbent on university leaders and their
advisors to ensure that their advancing innovation programs
competently address legitimate ethical concerns.
1. Conflicts of Interest and Other Ethical Problems
Even before the Bayh-Dole Act, universities worked with
industry in numerous ways. Among these are seemingly
innocuous charitable contributions (which can sometimes seem
harmful) as part of ordinary fundraising efforts.43 Other
examples include sponsored-research initiatives, engagements
with university researchers as consultants or advisors, and
arrangements where researchers and the university share
royalties, license fees, and equity ownership with industry.
Some worry that these latter types of interactions give rise to
inherent and nearly universal conflicts of interest and
supra note 12, at 34 (university-industry relationships increase “mutual
understanding of organizational missions, abilities, and constraints, and
generally builds trust between partners, a prerequisite for formalized
partnerships”).
40. See infra notes 35–45.
41. See infra notes 35–45; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note
12, at 69 (recognizing that some academics believe that funding from industry
negatively affects research and that universities must work to change those
perceptions).
42. See supra note 2.
43. Richard E. Just & Wallace E. Huffman, The Role of Patents, Royalties,
and Public-Private Partnering in University Funding, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
STANLEY
R.
JOHNSON,
Article
7,
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.bepress.com/sjohnson/art7.
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commitments that are inappropriate and cannot effectively be
reconciled.44
Such opponents argue that through such interaction, the
reliability of substantive research suffers because business can
or can be perceived to bias the choice and design of research
questions, how research is assigned to students,45 and criteria
or characteristics of those to be tested.46 Critics argue that
university-industry interactions compromise objectivity and
that industry will try to unduly influence research topics,
methods, results, and even the substantive reports
themselves.47 These concerns are legitimate, and this influence
can exist (or be perceived to exist) even if those involved are of
impeccable, ethical character.48
Opponents also contend that ethical conflicts threaten
academia itself by distracting from teaching and basic
research,49 undermining collegiality,50 encouraging secrecy,51
44. See BOK, supra note 31 at 66–67; Harrington, supra note 31, at 787;
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 18–23; see also Dick Thornburgh, Building
and Retaining Trust in the Biomedical Community, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED.
(SUPP.) S38, S39 (2007).
45. Harrington, supra note 31.
46. Id. at 776, 779; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19–20 (citations
omitted).
47. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 776, 788; BOK, supra note 31, at 71–
76; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19; see also Thornburgh, supra note 44,
at S40 (“[B]usiness considerations may inappropriately influence medical care,
purchasing decisions, and clinical research findings.”); JENNIFER WASHBURN,
UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 75
(2005) (“[C]orporate sponsors may be manipulating manuscripts or
suppressing unwelcome research to serve their commercial interests.”);
WASHBURN, supra, at 81 (“Far more common are instances where corporations
exert influence over academic research that is more subtle—and hence more
difficult to detect.”); WASHBURN, supra, at 84 (such as pre-selecting favorable
scholars); WASHBURN, supra, at 110 (control over trial design); WASHBURN,
supra, at 112 (publish favorable points and bury less favorable); WASHBURN,
supra, at 113 (suppressing negative studies).
48. BOK, supra note 31, at 67; see also WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 111
(using high profile academic “guest writers” can lead to imputed credibility
“when this is nothing more than an illusion”).
49. Harrington, supra note 31, at 780; BOK, supra note 31, at 64, 111;
WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 32; SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 20. But see
BOK, supra note 31, at 142 (“Two decades of experience reveals no significant
tendency to abandon basic research for more profitable kinds of applied or
practical work. Nor could anyone observing the growing numbers of learned
journals and scholarly books make a convincing case that serious scholarship
has suffered . . . . [T]he urge for discovery and the desire for respect from
worthy colleagues have been more than a match for the lure of making
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preventing or delaying publication,52 and devaluing humanities
and social sciences.53 Ironically, some universities have at
times demanded publication restrictions, transfer prohibitions,
and rights to future discoveries even though they might invoke
their own academic and research mission to object when others
seek to apply these restrictions to them.54
Unfortunately, compromised integrity in academia is not
new nor is it limited to relationships involving industry.55 Such
problems existed before the Bayh-Dole Act passed in 1980, and
money.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University
Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 94 (Gary Libecap
ed., 2005) (citing that the evidence is mixed on whether increased patenting
caused scientists to shifted toward more applied research).
50. BOK, supra note 31, at 113; Siegel, supra note 30, at 129; CREST
REPORT at 27.
51. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 127; Harrington, supra note 31, at 788;
BOK, supra note 31, at 64, 203–04; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 1,185
(citations omitted); SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 14; WASHBURN, supra
note 47, at 75; Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights:
Putting Patents in their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221, 251, 253, 263
(2006). But see Strandburg, supra note 49, at 94 (stating that it is unclear
whether increase in university patenting resulting from the Bayh-Dole Act is
connected to increasing delays and secrecy).
52. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 75; Bagley, supra note 51, at 240.
53. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 23–24, 33 (quoting Robert Berdahl from
the University of California Berkeley about “a corresponding devaluation of
the work of humanists and social scientists”).
54. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1420 (citing and quoting from a
study by the National Institutes of Health).
55. BOK, supra note 31, at 114; WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 33 (“Many
of the fundamental tensions that continue to pervade higher education
today⎯. . . the struggle between preserving autonomy and serving outside
interests⎯first surfaced in the nineteenth century.”). Researchers have been
known to fabricate data and manipulate analyses and results solely in the
name of tenure, publication, or reputation, without any reason to consider
money or business relationships. Relying on human frailty to argue that
universities should not engage with industry is tantamount to arguing that
human nature cannot be controlled, moderated, or trusted. Pursuing such an
argument to its logical conclusion would justify eliminating research
conducted by humans who work at universities. Rather than eliminate
university-industry relationships, the more reasonable course is to
acknowledge both the potential and weakness inherent in the human
condition and then institute policies and practices to effectively manage those
relationships to minimize the potential for lapses. See James G. Sheehan,
Fraud, Conflict of Interest, and Other Enforcement Issues in Clinical Research,
74 CLEV. CLINIC J. OF MED. (SUPP.) S63-S66 (2007) (arguing that fraud in
scientific research is a widespread problem, with examples including Sigmund
Freud, Isaac Newton, Louis Pasteur, and Gregor Mendel); see also Siepmann,
supra note 1, at 242 (noting that financial conflicts of interest have been in
place since government started funding research in 1950).
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they existed before universities increased their involvement
with industry56 Therefore, it is disingenuous to blame BayhDole or increased innovation for the ethical problems that exist
in academia. Furthermore, it is fallacious to suggest that if
universities barred or abandoned their efforts these ethical
problems would end. Regardless, opponents are correct that
ethical lapses can threaten safety, health, and the welfare of
individuals,57 and ultimately impact industry and its bottom
line.58
Industry has a vested interest in preserving academic and
research integrity or it risks losing money invested in
developing products based on faulty research, their profit
potential, and opportunities lost because of the wasted time
and focus.59 Such problems also can affect the quality of the
workforce and can devastate companies and their employees,
creditors, investors, and even communities. In addition, ethical
lapses can undermine reliability of research results that are or
are perceived to be compromised.
There is validity to the concerns raised by opponents and
critics of university–industry relationships, but neither the
problems nor the solutions should be overblown. Fortunately,
opponents of such relationships are not the only ones concerned
about the negative (and even potentially destructive) impact of
un-reconciled ethical problems.
Among the differences,
however, is that purist opponents appear prepared to forgo the
economic growth, advances in human welfare, and other
benefits of university–industry relationships while others
recognize that these benefits are valuable enough to justify
reconciling these problems appropriately.60 Congress appears
56. See infra notes 80–81
57. Harrington, supra note 31, at 776; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at
191.
58. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 797–98.
59. See generally WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 190–97 (quoting industry
representatives who complain about universities focusing on “profitmaximizing” behavior and neglect their roles as educators, innovators, and
experimenters).
60. See Harrington, supra note 31, at 783 (noting attempts at regulation
instead of elimination of university faculty conflicts of interest); BOK, supra
note 31, at 203–04 (urging universities to be “more vigilant in guarding their
basic academic values”); SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting
Katherine Ku from Stanford University’s Office of Technology Licensing about
the need to evaluate the criticisms of the Bayh-Dole Act); see also Zachary,
supra note 20 (explaining that risk of interference from industry and limits on

TYLER.WEB

2009]

2/20/2009 4:18:10 PM

ADVANCING UNIVERSITY INNOVATION

161

to be among the latter.61
2. Managing Ethical Problems, Respecting Academic Freedom,
and Advancing Innovation
In passing the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress intended for
universities to engage with industry.62 Congress must have
understood the possibility that such interaction could give rise
to conflicts of interest and other ethical problems. Yet,
Congress set federal policy as it did, from which we may
extrapolate that Congress expected the individual universities
to manage those problems, not to avoid or to over-react to them.
It does not follow that federal policy would tolerate the
systematic prohibition of interaction with business or other
draconian measures. Instead, it does follow that Congress
expects the university—particularly its leadership and
advisors—to balance the benefits to be gained from engagement
against the difficulties of conflicts of interest and other ethical
quandaries.63
Of course, given human nature and the dangers of
financial corruption, nothing is foolproof, but a properly aligned
pecuniary interest can motivate disciplined compliance with
academic integrity and ethical norms. Policies and procedures
appropriate to the university’s circumstances can minimize the
ethical risks and promote potential gains by ensuring that
those involved from the university and business are clear on
expectations. Clear expectations can guide those with good will
and judgment to pursue the legitimate benefits of universityacademic freedom seem “small”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra
note 12, at 69 (recommending that universities address the view among some
academics that funding from industry negatively affects research).
61. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress . . .
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities.”); see also supra note 2.
63. Harrington, supra note 31, at 808 (quoting University of California
conflict of interest disclosure policy: whether “potential public benefits to be
gained outweigh any potential erosion of academic freedom, collegiality, or
public trust”; and quoting University of Miami conflict of interest disclosure
policy, “the potential negative impacts that may arise from a significant
financial interest are outweighed by interests of scientific progress, technology
transfer, or the public health and welfare, then the University may allow the
project to go forward without imposing such conditions or restrictions”); see
also Edward D. Miller, Creating an Institutional Conflict-of-Interest Policy at
Johns Hopkins: Progress and Lessons Learned, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED.
(SUPP.) S70 (2007) (arguing that academic medical centers should focus on
managing conflict of interest risks).
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industry relationships. Jennifer Washburn, journalist, author,
and fellow at the New America Foundation, attempts this
ethical balancing act by proposing that universities prohibit
anyone in key research positions from having personal
financial ties or equity interests in any enterprise that might
benefit from the research.64 She also recommends that grant
recipients be barred from holding executive positions with or
serving in advisory capacities to companies that might benefit
from the research both when the research is undertaken and
for one or two years thereafter.65
While these suggestions perpetuate strong ethical
standards, they seem to overstate the bad in people. Although
potentially appropriate in unique situations at a given
university whose reputation has been denigrated, broad
adoption of Washburn’s or similar suggestions could discourage
pursuit of critical research, inhibit innovation, and deny access
to fundamental knowledge and experience.
Among the
problems with Washburn’s suggestions is the prospect that just
about anyone could benefit financially from the researcher’s
work except the people with the best knowledge of the research,
its applications, and who also took the greatest professional
risks.
In his review of Washburn’s book, J. Steven Rutt, Ph.D., a
practicing attorney and author, characterizes her concerns as
“partially valid but reflect[ing] a narrow, if not distorted,
idealism about big university life, bordering on naiveté.”66 He
continues that a “university divorced from commerce can easily
become a microcosm of its own, driven by egos, elitism, petty
rivalry, and hunger for grant money.”67 Rutt dismisses
Washburn’s suggestion for the pursuit of “[a] purely academic
focus, divorced from common sense, ethical thinking, public
service, the real world, and traditional ideals of academia [that]
is not a desirable alternative to the status quo.”68
Stated another way, Washburn’s recommendations do not
effectively balance the relevant competing interests enough to
64. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 235
65. Id.
66. J. Steven Rutt, Bayh-Dole and Nanotechnology: A Review of
University Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education, 2 NANOTECH
L. & BUS. 405, 407 (2005) (book review).
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id.
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justify its universal adoption or even consideration. Certain
institutions may find her recommendations necessary,
particularly if they need to rebuild lost or tarnished trust.
Integrity and credibility can be appropriately protected,
however, without implementing such extreme steps and
incurring the accompanying lost opportunities and potential
unfairness.
The primary strategies for solving the problems Washburn
and others present are various degrees of transparency to
funders, administrations, publishers, and the public regarding
following:
a. grants, sponsorships, and other sources of funding
toward related research, equipment, personnel, etc.;
b. the identities of collaborators and even those who
shaped research questions, protocol, and methodology; and
c. sources, types and amounts of consulting, advising, and
investing revenue and extent of time spent away from academic
responsibilities in pursuit of such revenue.
Other complementary strategies that universities have
adopted include increased oversight over research and its
protocols, replication of research results by uninvolved neutral
researchers, leaves-of-absence for the researcher, diversified
sources of funding to protect against dependency and the
corresponding leverage (real or perceived), limiting delays in
publication to minimally necessary time requirements, setting
reasonable limits on compensation researchers may receive in
conflicted circumstances,69 and establishing panels or other
informed resources to provide perspectives on specific
situations. The degree to which universities incorporate these
and other strategies may depend on the degree of the
university’s involvement with industry and the sophistication
of the university’s leadership, advisors, and researchers.
In addition, effective university conflicts-of-interest and
ethics programs should require education for researchers and
funders and impose consequences for violators. Education and
training can ensure both awareness of the procedures and
69. For instance, the Mayo Clinic does not accept royalty payments and
does not permit its researchers to accept such payments on commercial tests
any Mayo physician may order. Interview with Michael J. Ackerman, M.D.,
Ph.D., Director of the Long QT Syndrome Clinic at the Mayo Clinic, in
Rochester, MN (Aug. 12, 2008). Mayo has adopted this approach to ensure
that patients can be confident that such tests are not motivated by pecuniary
interests. Id.
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understanding about why they exist, which can enhance
compliance.
Some might find it unnecessary to implement
consequential punishment in their conflicts-of-interest
programs, because of the threat that a researcher’s reputation
and the credibility of his or her research may suffer, that he or
she may have difficulty obtaining or keeping tenure, a job, or
grant funding, or that he or she may be liable for civil or
criminal remedies. The university must be able to protect itself
and preserve its reputation, however, and the ability to mete
out consequences can help.
When a researcher(s) or others conclude that the benefits
of unethical behavior outweigh the likelihood of getting caught
or attendant harm, appropriately promulgated and imposed
consequences can motivate compliance and deter others from
non-compliance.70 In addition, having the ability to impose
consequences may be critical for the university and its
leadership to minimize damage to institutional trust and
integrity. Consequences are likely to differ between tenured
and non-tenured faculty but should refer to a spectrum that
includes demotion, reassignment, disgorgement, suspension,
and even termination.
Ironically, academia itself—whose members are among the
most vociferous opponents of university engagement with
industry—can impose serious consequences for severe ethical
lapses, but is reluctant to do so.71 Their opposition, in the
70. For example, when former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill became
CEO of Alcoa he identified worker safety as a key priority. Early in his tenure,
he terminated a highly ranked employee, who many viewed as a superstar,
because he failed to report an injury within 24 hours of its occurrence as
required by safety rules. Alcoa’s accident rate went down to virtually zero. See
Susan H. Ehringhaus et al., Guidelines and Performance: Creating a Culture
of Ethics, Panel Discussion, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. OF MED. (SUPP.) S77, S77–S78
(2007).
71. See John G. Bruhn et al., Moral Positions and Academic Conduct:
Parameters of Tolerance for Ethics Failure, 73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 461,476–77
(2002) (citing others that faculty accuse administrators of intrusion on
academic freedom when administrators even attempt to gather information
about misconduct); THE GALLUP ORG. FOR THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH
INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINAL REPORT:
OBSERVING AND REPORTING SUSPECTED MISCONDUCT IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH 14–16, 40 (2006) (revised April 2008) (referencing a survey of 2,212
National Institutes of Health researchers found that 164 scientists reported
201 incidents of misconduct such as falsification, fabrication, or plagiarism;
estimating also that thirty-six percent of suspected misconduct incidents not
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name of academic freedom, can undermine deterrence and
protect unethical actors and behaviors. Yet, such people are
prepared to compromise academic freedom by preventing
constructive engagement with industry and placing other limits
on informed judgment and decision-making. Such opposition
suggests an irreconcilable paradox in which academic freedom
seems more important than appropriately punishing unethical
behavior but not as important as efforts to manage the
circumstances that might give rise to unethical behavior in the
first place.
Valiantly pursuing appropriate ethical standards and
institutional integrity is worthwhile for its own sake, but there
is another important benefit to a balanced program. Managing
these matters properly can teach several lessons to those
involved with and those who observe the program—particularly
students and faculty—who will take their experiences into
business and public service.
Their engagement provides
invaluable training in the importance of ethical behavior and
facing, rather than avoiding, these difficult problems. It
teaches that such dilemmas are not merely theoretical
classroom exercises but have “real world” implications. And, if
pursued appropriately, the struggle for balanced ethics can
teach tangible, constructive approaches to resolving these
sometimes perplexing problems, not just in academia but in
business and public service.
Business and society need universities to find the right
balance between militant, inefficient processes at one extreme,
and narcissistic self-indulgence at the other.72 In doing so,
universities need to ensure that the policies and practices used
reported to institutional officials); Scott Jaschik, Truth and Consequences,
May 17, 2006, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/05/17/churchill
(explaining an investigation by the University of Colorado of alleged
misconduct by Ward Churchill which came only after controversial comments
about the victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, despite long standing
“knowledge” among scholars of alleged plagiarism, falsification, and
fabrication; detailing further that two panel members opposed Churchill’s
termination to protect academic freedom); Jonathon Knight & Carol J. Auster,
Faculty Conduct: An Empirical Study of Ethical Activism, 70 J. HIGHER EDUC.
188, 203 (1999) (explaining that administrators took no action in about sixtyone percent of complaints of misconduct such as plagiarism and sexual
harassment).
72. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 31, at 808 (citing University of
California conflict of interest policy); see also Thornburgh, supra note 44, at
S38 (encourages focus on facilitating effective disclosure of potential conflicts
and ensuring their transparent and consistent management).
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to promote ethical behavior and remediate violations are not
worse than the problems being remedied and that the perfect
does not become the enemy of the good.73 Moreover, industry
needs to avoid short-sightedness through which it can be its
own worst enemy by tempting the reliability and integrity of
university innovation and research. It is worth struggling to
get the balance right and keep it right, even as circumstances
change. After all, undertaking this challenge is implicitly
corollary to our nation’s policies regarding advancing university
innovation.74
III. BAYH-DOLE ACT OF 1980
There is controversy about the effectiveness of Bayh-Dole
and its impact on university advancing innovation.75 Some of
the controversy revolves around principles of “causation”
(whether Bayh-Dole caused an increase in patenting, licensing,
and other outputs) as distinguished from the Act’s
“effectiveness” (the extent to which Bayh-Dole was one of many
factors that may have promoted an already burgeoning
university interest in advancing innovation).76
Bayh-Dole apologists are correct that the Act achieved its

73. Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Voltaire (last visited Oct. 16,
2008) (quoting VOLTAIRE, Dramatic Art, in QUESTIONS SUR L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE
(1764) (literally translated as “The best is the enemy of good”).
74. See supra note 2.
75. See Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of
Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 13–14 (2001)
(citing the widespread impression that increases in university technology
transfer attributable to the Bayh-Dole Act but explanation more complex);
Scott Shane, Encouraging University Entrepreneurship? The Effect of the
Bayh-Dole Act on University Patenting in the United States, 19 J. BUS.
VENTURING 127, 128 (2004); see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 7;
David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High Technology Entrepreneurship
in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, in UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39, 41 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that the
emphasis on Bayh-Dole as prompting university and industry collaboration
ignores history stretching back to early twentieth century); Strandburg, supra
note 49, at 94 (“clear evidence . . . that patenting at universities has increased
drastically over the past 30 years, but less clear evidence linking the increased
patenting to the Bayh-Dole Act itself”); Strandburg, supra note 49, at 103
(referring to Professors Eisengerg and Rai’s extensive work on the potential
adverse effects of Bayh-Dole); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 262;
Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 16, at 320.
76. See, e.g., Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 16, at 320.
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primary objective. It has helped smooth the commercialization
process by imposing consistency among federal agencies in the
United States about how they treat intellectual property
generated from federally funded research.77 Some point to the
Act and claim success or even victory based on statistics about
the growth in the number of technology transfer offices at
universities,78 the increasing numbers of licenses and other
university transactions, increased revenue from those
transactions, and even more start-up companies emerging from
university innovations.79
Unfortunately, many of the technology transfer offices that
began to proliferate after Bayh-Dole seem to have emerged
without adequate consideration about how the offices fit within
and in service to the academic mission, the numerous
intellectual property strategies available in addition to
patenting and licensing, the financial and personnel resources
necessary to operate such offices most effectively, and the Act’s
other purposes. Instead, many university leaders and their
advisers, including many from the legal profession, seem to
have focused technology transfer offices and university policies
and behaviors on commercializing research outcomes with
particular emphasis on generating revenue through patenting
and licensing,80 with a further focus on pursuing the rare
77. Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 1010, at 278; Ritchie de Larena,
supra note 10, at 1437.
78. The Association of University Technology Managers reports that
twenty-seven universities had technology transfer offices and programs before
1983. Between 1983 and 1999, approximately one hundred and twenty
universities started programs, and about fifteen more were added between
2000 and 2006. During the same time parameters, hospitals and research
institutions added six (pre-1983), between nineteen and twenty-five (19831999), and five technology transfer offices (2000–2006), respectively. AUTM,
U.S. LICENSING SURVEY, FY 2005 SURVEY SUMMARY 16–17 (Dana Bostrom &
Robert
Tieckelmann
eds.,
2007),
available
at
http://www.autm.net/events/File/US_LS_05Final(1).pdf [hereinafter AUTM
2005]; AUTM, U.S. LICENSING SURVEY, FY 2006 SURVEY SUMMARY 14–15
(Dana Bostrom & Robert Tieckelmann eds., 2007), available at
http://www.autm.net/events/file/AUTM_06_US%20LSS_FNL.pdf [hereinafter
AUTM 2006].
79. Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155–56 (2006); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share
Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the BayhDole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 410 (2006).
80. Markman et al., supra note 11, at 250–51, 253–54, 257; Boettiger &
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273–74 (noting that university focus on goal of
income has in part shaped function of technology transfer system); Boettiger &
Bennett, supra note 10, at 280 (suggesting that having income as a primary
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financial home run.81
If university leaders are going to limit the charge of
technology transfer offices to patenting and licensing or
research outcomes with revenue potential, the university
should have other means by which they are implementing the
balance of Bayh-Dole’s mandates.
Restricting innovation
efforts in this way facilitates being overly focused on patenting
and revenue to the detriment of other, potentially more useful
strategies and lost opportunities for other non- or low revenue
innovations.
Although commercialization should not be
abandoned or ignored, it is only part of one of the seven
purposes Congress expressed in the Act.82
At some institutions, inadequate consideration has also
been given to the increasing complexity of relationships,
opportunities, and strategies associated with advancing
innovations.83 As a result, many technology transfer offices are
under-staffed, under-resourced, and under-supported.84
These circumstances further impact how technology
transfer offices fulfill responsibilities that relate to intellectual
property rights, valuation, risk assessments, licensing
strategies, and otherwise. They also can affect how researchers
view advancing innovation and how they relate to those
goal led universities to “develop isolated programs and . . . overprotect
inventions with unproven commercial value”); Ritchie de Larena, supra note
10, at 1381; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 21
(referencing the “misalignment of incentive systems” and encouraging that
universities more appropriately link outputs to incentives); PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 35 (technology transfer personnel should be
assessed on their value added or volume of products or knowledge moved
instead of revenue generated and Federal agencies and universities should
provide incentives for “industry participation, entrepreneurship activities and
fostering State and local involvement”).
81. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1381–82 (constant lottery effect);
see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (encouraging
universities to approach advancing innovation with a “volume model” rather
than a “home run” or income model).
82. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 § 200, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202(a), 202(c)(1), 202(c)(7)(B) (2000))
(explaining that among the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act are “to promote the
commercialization and public availability”); see also supra note 7 for the Act’s
purposes quoted in their entirety.
83. Bagley, supra note 51 at, 262–63; Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at
1412 (citations omitted); see Markman et al., supra note 11, at 261 (noting
disparities in sophistication and success of the 128 technology transfer offices
in the study).
84. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 230.
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responsible for helping them do so. Finally, researchers can
infer from these indicators whether university leaders view
cooperation with advancing innovation efforts as important.
Congress intended Bayh-Dole to facilitate the usefulness of
federally funded university research and innovation, and it
stated a desire that university leaders implement it with a
hunger for more than just revenue. Instead, university
technology transfer office mission statements overwhelmingly
emphasize licensing for royalties and intellectual property
protection and management.85 Frequently lacking has been an
emphasis on (and sometimes even recognition of) Bayh-Dole’s
corollary goals of promoting the “utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research and development”
and “the public availability of inventions made in the United
States,” which seems to encourage an emphasis on “deal flow
density rather than volume.”86
Taking their lead from mission statements and in an era of
management theories such as total quality management,
dashboards, benchmarking, six sigma, and other purported
success measures of the 1980s and 1990s, many universities
began using linear standards of measure to demonstrate their
compliance with federal policy under Bayh-Dole and their
federal grants.87 Those measures predictably have resulted in
counting: disclosures, patent applications, patents, start-ups,
85. Markman et al., supra note 11, at 253–54. In a sample of 128
university technology transfer office mission statements, the authors found
that they mentioned licensing for royalties 78.72% of the time and intellectual
property protection and management 75.18% of the time. These mission
statements mentioned the public good 54.61% of the time to finish in fifth
place. Id.
86. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200; see Crow, supra note 13, at 24
(explaining Arizona State University’s strategic objectives for advancing
innovation and expounding further that “in other words, to maximize the
number of investions and discoveries actually moved into use, instead of trying
to maximize near-term income from fewer and bigger deals”); WASHBURN,
supra note 47, at 146 (“[Universities] have no duty to return value to
shareholders, and their principal obligation under the Bayh-Dole Act is to
promote utilization, not to maximize financial returns. . .”) (quoting National
Institutes of Health 1998 working group report) (alteration in original);
Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1377 (objectives of Bayh-Dole have not
been fully achieved); Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1385 (objectives of
Act to promote technology transfer through licensing, not to enrich
universities) (quotation omitted).
87. See, e.g., Schacht, 33528, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that increased
federal funds for basic research were expected to yield “concomitant” increases
in new products and processes but “this linear concept is no longer considered
valid”).
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and of course royalties and other revenues.88 While these
standards serve certain purposes, they do not fully measure
results or effectiveness against the broader purposes of BayhUnfortunately, this approach to measurement
Dole.89
contributed to university personnel focusing too intently on the
patent-license model, which narrowed the entire vision for
university innovation.90
To some degree, how universities have operated under
Bayh-Dole might be analogized to people who tend to look at
advancing innovation through a particular window in a room
with a full circle, panoramic view of forests, meadows, beaches,
and mountains, depending on the window. Even if the view
through any particular window is good, it is not the only
window in the room. There are other views––other windows—
that contribute to the overall view from the room with the other
windows enhancing appreciation of the beauty. Failing or
refusing to take advantage of the views offered from other
windows denies potential by denying information and
alternatives; it also can lead to a distorted reality reminiscent
of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.91
The biggest problems with Bayh-Dole have nothing to do
with the underlying Act itself. Instead, the problems seem to
88. See Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33–34; see also PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 23.
89. See Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33 (“There are several difficulties
with the output data.”); Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University
Innovations: A Better Way 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper
No.
O18,
M13,
033,
034,
038,
2007),
available
at
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf (“while many of the university
TTOs met their narrow mandate by channeling university-generated
inventions into generating revenue for the university, the broader and more
fundamental goal of the original Bayh-Dole Act remains elusive—to maximize
the potential for university-based inventions to result in commercialized new
products and innovations.”).
90. Id. at 8–9 (“Measuring university success in spawning innovation
solely by licensing or patenting activities, therefore, almost certainly masks
the importance of these other means of knowledge diffusion.”); Siegel Study,
supra note 29, at 34, tbl.6 (“Other respondents noted that TTOs are . . . too
concerned with the legal aspects of licensing.”).
91. VII PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 514a-17a (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books,
1968). For an academic discussion of a few of the alternative and
complementary approaches to advancing university innovation, see Litan et
al., supra note 89, at 11–16 (among the strategies discussed are patenting,
multiple volume approaches, faculty free agency, regional alliances, internetbased approaches, and faculty loyalty); see also Boettiger & Bennett, supra
note 10, at 279 & n.71 (patent-licensing channel is one of many avenues).
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arise from the perceptions that existed, and in some
institutions still exist, that revenue is the objective and
measuring revenue-related activities in the name of complying
with Bayh-Dole is the same as or better than measuring
impact, outcomes, and results. Also contributing to problems
may be perceptions that doing something is good enough, when
the true objective is doing more or better. Unfortunately, many
have sought to pursue the Act’s purposes as technical functions
rather than as a component of an overall entrepreneurial
culture.92
Another problem facing those engaged in advancing
university innovations is that, contrary to some perceptions,
Bayh-Dole did not solve (and was not intended to solve) many
of the problems that researchers, administrators, and industry
have been complaining about since long before Bayh-Dole
passed in 1980.93 Nearly three decades later, the following
problems remain and, in some cases, have become even greater
impediments to the effective and efficient exploitation of
university innovations:
the high cost of patent management;
the “infrequent and unpredictable” occurrence of the “home
run” innovation;
the need for close relationships with faculty;
the impact on academic freedom, research integrity, and
conflicts of interest;
maintaining strong, appropriate relationships with the
community;
problems associated with balancing revenues with other
university expectations for its research and technology transfer
endeavors; and
the expense in time and money, stress, and anxiety
associated with negotiating licenses, assignments, use rights,
royalties, license fees, indemnification, representations,
92. Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 3; cf. Megan Ristau Baca, Note,
Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs in Scientific
Collaboration, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 14 (2006),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0004.pdf
(“[the
Bayh-Dole Act] provides a somewhat perverse incentive to privatize at a very
early stage of research . . . .”).
93. WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 33 (“Many of the fundamental tensions
that continue to pervade higher education today . . . first surfaced in the
nineteenth century.”); Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1403 (“Problems
with university management of federal funds predate passage of the BayhDole Act.”).

TYLER.WEB

172

2/20/2009 4:18:10 PM

MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

warranties, covenants and other terms.94
To some degree these barriers originate from the persistent
complaint that the numerous participants do not know or
understand each other’s work environments, procedures,
terminologies, rewards, constraints, etc.95 However, and at the
risk of giving industry a free pass, the barriers also may reflect
the university’s approach to vision, policies, and behavior and
the lack of consistency among them and with federal policy.
IV. ALIGNING VISION WITH POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR
AND WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF BAYH-DOLE AND
FEDERAL POLICY
Some universities successfully deploy a broad-based,
holistic approach to advance their innovations and fulfill their
responsibilities under Bayh-Dole, as recipients of federal grant
dollars, and to society generally. They frequently have an
awareness of themselves that informs their policies and guides
their behavior. Some of these universities and their efforts predate Bayh-Dole, and there is much that can be learned from
them, including their continuous efforts to react to, influence,
and benefit from frequently changing laws, court cases,
administrative policies, technology, knowledge, infrastructure,
personnel, etc.
Universities with quality reputations for advancing
innovation—for instance, Stanford, University of CaliforniaBerkeley, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), and
Wisconsin’s
WARF
(“Wisconsin
Alumni
Research
Foundation”)— have unique and sometimes polar opposite
approaches to advancing innovation. Each has developed
different models and approaches customized to its unique
priorities and circumstances. Their models work for them
because they have either evolved over time in conjunction with
their research prominence and cultures, or they have been

94. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 58, 72.
95. One of the most significant problems in the licensing process is that
the participants do not know or understand each others’ work environments,
procedures, terminology, rewards, constraints, etc. SCHACHT, 33527, supra
note 7, at 3; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 3 and 33
(barriers to university-industry collaboration and innovation include
“misalignment of cultures, management structures, and goals; as well as
differences in the policies that apply to IP, proprietary information, and
publication”).
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thoughtfully and strategically developed to take advantage of
strengths and compensate for weaknesses.96 Likely, it is a
combination of both. However, trying to import Stanford’s,
WARF’s, or MIT’s model will likely fail because—at the risk of
stating the obvious—there is no single, universal way for a
university to advance its innovations; there is no “silver bullet”
and what works in one ecosystem may not work under different
circumstances.97
That being said, there are certain common themes to be
derived from others’ efforts. The discussion that follows is
based on lessons learned from at least eleven studies involving
a total of 128 different universities (many of which participated
in several studies),98 independent research and interviews, and
96. Cf. Carl J. Schramm, Making the Turn: Entrepreneurial Capitalism
and Its European Promise, 72 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 480, 486 (2006)
(encouraging countries to learn from each other but to develop tailored
policies).
97. Id. at 482 (“Danger, or at least disappointment, awaits those who
attempt singular policy solutions.”); Mark L. Gordon, University Controlled or
Owned Technology: The State of Commercialization and Recommendations, 30
J.C. & U.L. 641, 658 (2004) (“there is no one optimal structure for programs of
this type.”); TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (noting that these
relationships have pluralistic and individually tailored approaches that
consider internal and external cultures, customs, and experiences); NILSSON
ET AL., supra note 35, at 7, 12 (changing a single factor such as ownership of
intellectual property is not likely to be a “magic bullet” but must address a
number of mechanisms collectively); NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 22
(“There is no such thing as a single US model, but an array of different
combinational elements.”) (quotation omitted); LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra
note 1, at 60 (“there is no a one-size-fits-all approach to governance.”);
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 176 (“these . . .studies reveal great
heterogeneity within even a small sample of technologies.”); PALMINTERA,
supra note 2, at viii (“a successful practice in one environment may not be a
successful practice in another since resources, cultures, environments and
priorities vary from university to university, community to community, and
state to state.”); Andrew Nelson & Thomas Byers, Organizational Modularity
and Intra-University Relationships Between Entrepreneurship Education and
Technology Transfer in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 275, 303 (Gary
Libecap ed., 2005) (approaches to technology transfer are context dependent);
see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4, 33, 37 (there is no
“one-size-fits-all” approach or “ideal structure” for successful universityindustry relationships).
98. Excluding Markman et al.’s study of 128 university technology
transfer offices and Siegel’s study of 113, the remaining nine studies analyzed
forty-four universities. Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 4–7 (Cornell
University); Gordon, supra note 97, at 650–56 (University of WisconsinMadison,Wisconsin, Stanford University, University of Illinois, University of
Notre Dame, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of
Cambridge); Harrington, supra note 31, at 800 & n.103 (University of North
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experience negotiating with and on behalf of universities.
Three common characteristics seem to emerge about
universities that successfully advance their innovations. First,
these universities know themselves—who they are and who
they want to be.
Adjuncts to this self-awareness are
understandings of the realities of revenue potential and risk
allocation. Universities build their vision and culture on this
knowledge and awareness. In addition, these universities
implement policies and pursue behavior consistent with and in
furtherance of their informed vision and desired culture.
A. KNOW YOURSELF
Many factors shape university efforts to advance their
innovation: leadership, personnel, resources (financial and
otherwise), policies, procedures, vision, laws and regulations—
in other words, an entire ecosystem. As with other ecosystems,
the components and their relative influence vary from
institution to institution. Consequently, it is critical that each
institution know itself so that it may best assess the
appropriate strategies to pursue and the cultural, personnel,
Carolina system, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, University of
Missouri-Columbia, University of California system, University of Illinois
system, Miami University (of Ohio), New York University, Harvard
University, Yale University, Duke University); Markman et al., supra note 11,
at 260 (128 universities); Nelson, supra note 75, at 14 (Stanford University,
University of California system, and Columbia University); NILSSON ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 65, 72 (University of Pennsylvania, University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill); PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at 21 (Carnegie Mellon
University, Georgia Tech, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Purdue
University, Stanford University, University of California-San Diego,
University of Pennsylvania, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Washington
University in St. Louis); PAYTAS, ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–94 (University of
Michigan, Wright State University (Dayton), New Mexico State, University,
Lehigh University (Allentown), West Virginia University, Virginia Tech,
University of Northern Iowa (Cedar Falls), Florida State University); Siegel
Study, supra note 29, at 16 (113 universities); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C.
Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty Participation in Licensing, in UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 187, 198–99 (Gary C. Libecap ed., 2005) (Cornell
University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of
Pennsylvania, Purdue University, Texas A&M University, University of
Wisconsin-Madison); TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (Carnegie Mellon
University, Georgia Tech, North Carolina State, University, Ohio State
University, Pennsylvania State University, Purdue University, Stanford
University, Texas A&M University, University of Wisconsin, Virginia Tech,
University of California-San Diego, University of Utah).
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and other changes it needs to make for success. In particular,
universities with strong reputations for advancing their
innovations know their research strengths and capacity, and
they recognize the role of technology transfer in fulfilling the
university’s overall mission.
1. Quality Research
As former president of Harvard University Derek Bok,
Anna Nilsson and her colleagues from the Swedish Institute for
Growth Policy Studies, and others have recognized, the
university builds its framework for advancing innovation on
the quality of the underlying research being done.99 Without
high quality research and outcomes to feed the pipeline,
nothing else matters in this area.100 Quality research can exist
without effective advancing innovation—as is often the actual
case—but effective, credible advancing innovation (or even the
technology transfer subset) cannot exist without quality
research.
Two of the most important drivers of quality research are
The
the credentials and quality of the researchers.101
researchers’ reputations for integrity also can be as important
as the substantive methodology, results, or assessments.
Although not a legitimate excuse for universities to tolerate
bureaucracy, industry is likely to put up with some level of
99. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 7; BOK, supra note 31, at 106
(“Research universities are rarely, if ever, any better than their faculties.”);
PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at ix (“Excellent university technology transfer is
built on excellent research.”); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 192
(without faculty there would be no inventions to license).
100. See WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 187–88 (“The university can be a
driving force if it’s a great center for science—not if it’s a great center for
technology transfer. Technology transfer is . . . a secondary objective at best,
probably even a third-level objective. Anybody that moves it to a higher-level
objective than that is foolhardy. Because they will corrupt the university for
sure.”) (quoting Michael Crow, formerly of Columbia University’s Office of
Technology Transfer and current President of the Arizona State University)
(emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
101. Id. at 186 (“[T]he faculty that have been the most successful
commercially are the best scientists that we have. Not, you know, among the
best, but the best—those who’ve made the most fundamental research
breakthroughs.”) (quoting Michael Crow, formerly of Columbia University
Office of Technology Transfer and current President of Arizona State
University); Nelson, supra note 75, at 3 (noting that all three of the
universities studied—Stanford, California, and Columbia—”place a very high
premium on the scientific reputation of their faculty. The research that is done
there, and the faculty that is selected and tenured, reflect these criteria . . .”).
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inefficiency and bureaucracy to work with the right, reputable
researchers.
Therefore, to a large degree, the path to
“enlightenment”—at least in this field—begins with identifying
and assessing the strengths of the research being conducted
and recruiting needs to attract and retain new personnel,
facilities, and other resources to more fully develop research
potential.
2. A Vision That Drives Behavior
Armed with an understanding of research priorities and
potential, successful universities know and understand what
they want from their advancing innovation programs.102 Is the
goal money, service to society, fulfillment of fundamental
teaching and research missions, keeping a given professor
happy, or something else entirely? How does the institution
view advancing innovation—as something technical and
procedural or as something organizational and cultural?103 The
answers to these and other questions and the process by which
the questions are answered frequently influence, if not dictate,
policies and behavior, staffing decisions, allocation of resources,
and priorities—all of which in turn influence whether a
university is maximizing its innovative potential.104
102. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 49 (explaining that without clarity
of purpose, universities cannot structure activities in a way most suitable for
achieving goals, including in allocating resources, technological emphasis,
modes of transfer, information flow, organizational design, and human
resources strategies); BOK, supra note 31, at 6 (“[A] university must have a
clear sense of the values needed to pursue its goals with a high degree of
quality and integrity. When the values become blurred and begin to lose their
hold, the urge to make money quickly spreads throughout the institution.”);
Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that university leaders should
consider technology transfer from a strategic perspective, driven by long term
goals); Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 29 (saying that strategic approach to
technology transfer includes establishing institutional goals and priorities,
allocation of resources, organizational design and structure, human resource
management practices, and reward systems); Brett M. Frischmann,
Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A
View from the Demand Side, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
155, 178–80, 182 (Gary Libecap ed., 2005) (noting that each university must
determine its own ideology and mission, including how to proceed based on the
university’s objectives for science and research systems determined after
careful evaluation of the immediate context, giving consideration to their role
in society and how they compare with other institutions and social contexts).
103. See Coffman et al., supra note 2, at 3.
104. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 189 (“It is important that university
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Some people look for answers to these questions in
university or department vision, mission, or goal statements.
The presence of appropriate words can be useful as an objective
statement of priority, as are statements by university
leadership in speeches and articles. For instance, Mary Sue
Coleman, Ph.D., the President of the University of Michigan,
offers one admirable perspective to explain why her institution
participates in technology transfer:
Many people are often confused about why we are interested in
technology commercialization, in nurturing startup companies, and in
facilitating more patents and license agreements. It is not about the
promise of future revenues that might be generated from this
activity. . . . It is not about the money. Technology transfer must serve
our core mission: sharing ideas and innovations in the service of
society’s well-being.105

The right words in the right places, however, are not
enough. As in other areas of life, words alone can have little
meaning, and they become a liability if they are not accurately
and consistently reflected in policies and behavior.106
administrators recognize that technology transfer and licensing are
components of and subsidiary to their central institutional missions of
education and research. . . [and that] university policies must be consistent
with this understanding as well.”); PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at x (detailing
that an entrepreneurial culture is “perhaps the strongest and most pervasive
influence on [university] technology transfer and commercialization
performance” as evidenced by implicit and/or explicit rewards and incentives
for faculty and hiring practices that favor industry and entrepreneurial
experience).
105. W. Mark Crowell, A Message From the President, in AUTM, U.S.
LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2004 (Ashley J. Stevens et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/AUTM_US/A05121
6S.pdf [hereinafter AUTM 2004] (message from AUTM’s then-president,
Mark Crowell) (quoting University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman,
Ph.D. during 2005 AUTM Annual Meeting) (internal paragraph structure
omitted); see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 27 (“[I]t should not be
overlooked that university inventions, arising, as most of them do, from basic
research, have led to many products which have or exhibit the capability of
saving lives or of improving the lives, safety and health of the citizens of the
United States and around the world. In that context their contribution to
society is immeasurable.”) (quoting Howard Bremer, patent counsel to
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation from 1960–1988) (citation omitted).
106. See Edward Soule, Managing Ethical Performance in Organizations:
Insights from the Corporate World, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. (SUPP.) S73, S75
(2007) (asserting that calls for ethical conduct are only as good as the culture
in which they operate and amount to little more than cheerleading without
systematic management of ethical performance); Ehringhuas et al., supra note
70, at S77-S78 (citing example of Paul O’Neill who, upon becoming chief
executive officer of Alcoa, identified worker safety as a priority and then
terminated a highly ranked superstar who failed to report an injury within 24
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Inconsistency can damage an institution’s credibility and
reputation. Pronouncements about advancing innovation being
an institutional priority bespeak hypocrisy when not matched
by dedication of appropriate resources and the consistent
implementation of policies and behaviors,107 which ultimately
evidences the priority given advancing innovation.108
When there is alignment, the reputation, culture and
results can be powerful and persuasive.109 Of course, obtaining
and maintaining such alignment is hard work and takes
time.110 The understanding of and vision for how advancing
innovation fits the university mission must include patience,
tolerance for a certain amount of ambiguity, and no expectation
of short-term, quick fixes111 One goal must be to implement
hours of its occurrence as required by the safety rules); TORNATZKY, ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 18–20.
107. Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3 (considering technology transfer
from a strategic perspective implies providing sufficient resources to achieve
the objectives); see also SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 33 (conveying that
researchers report that rigid, cumbersome and unclear policies impede
technology transfer).
108. Patrick Jones & Stephen O’Neil, Can the TTO Manage its own
Disintermediation?, KAUFFMAN THOUGHTBOOK 2007, at 166, 166 (2007) (the
mission of technology transfer offices is frequently subject to misalignment,
which results in increased attention to commercial innovations and money
resulting in overprotecting other things).
109. While an appropriate vision consistent with behaviors can contribute
greatly to efforts to advance university innovation, many in the field struggle
with administrations that either do not realize the importance of the need for
vision or for advancing innovation at all. If that is the case, there are several
ways to try to elicit vision from the administration and, maybe even more
importantly, influence what that vision might be. Among these are to ask
questions and, in putting the questions in context, making sure that the
administration understands that multiple options and approaches exist. They
may believe that there is only one vision—money. As is made more clear later,
there is not much money (relatively) in technology transfer, and the money
that is made usually results from a convergence of fortuitous circumstances
and a supportive ecosystem. Second, the benefits of looking beyond the
primary sources of money can be material, but they flow from a vision, policies
and behavior that recognize the non-monetary benefits of advancing
innovation, such as better educational experiences for students, the ability to
attract high quality researchers for faculty, and an enhanced reputation for
success.
110. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003 , supra note 1, at 10 (introducing a
successful commercialization program requires considerable time of ten years
or greater).
111. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 (“complexity . . . demands a
strategic plan with a long-term view.”); see also PALMINTERA, supra note 2, at
xi; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 9 (commercialization tools
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vision with policies and behaviors—including performance
measures, negotiating strategies, allocation of resources, etc.—
that appropriately convey the promise of advancing university
innovation as a priority in the university’s pursuit of its entire
mission, not just revenue.
3. Understanding Financial and Revenue Realities
In the scheme of things, there is not much money to be
gained from advancing innovation.112 Of course, when people
see that universities have spawned Google, Yahoo, Gatorade,
vitamin D, Lycos, Genentech and other financial blockbusters,
many involved expect more innovations to yield similar
This has the unfortunate effect of imposing
returns.113
unrealistic expectations on technology transfer offices and
placing undue emphasis on money, which then also contributes
to the one-window view and linear, old economy performance
measures discussed above.114 Such attribution also encourages
need to allow flexibility in a “rapidly changing environment”); Boettiger &
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (maturing a portfolio of university intellectual
property can take years); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 274, 279
(long-term commitment of time and money).
112. See BOK, supra note 24, at 77; see also NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35,
at 11 (discouraging university participation based on a profit motive: “it is
risky and few universities profit from it”) (citing Thursby & Thursby, supra
note 98); Behfar Bastani et al., Technology Transfer in Nanotechnology:
Licensing Intellectual Property from Universities to Industry, 1 NANOTECH. L.
& BUS. 166, 167 (2004) (“In general, income from licensing is fairly small in
comparison to a university’s total budget, or even in comparison to a
university’s sponsored research budget.”); LAMBERT & BUTLER, supra note 1,
at 51; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 6; cf. Philip A. Pizzo, Fostering
Innovation Without Compromising Integrity, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. (SUPP.)
S10, S11 (2007) (reporting that the number of patents that have a huge yield is
very low; they get all the attention, but there are hundreds if not thousands
that fail or basically go nowhere); Siepmann, supra note 1, at 235; Ritchie de
Larena, supra note 10, at 1431.
113. SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 138 (noting “that many schools have
unrealistic perceptions of the economic importance of their faculties’
research”); see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 84; BOK, supra note 31,
at 77; Libecap, supra note 34 at xii (citing Mowery about unrealistic
expectations universities have about licensing revenue).
114. See Markman et al., supra note 11, at 251 (“Many universities instruct
their [technology transfer offices] to focus primarily on developing their
royalty stream.”); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 253 (“the expressed
purpose of most [technology transfer offices] is to generate rents from scientific
discovery . . . .”); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (explaining that
university focus on income generation has in part shaped the functioning of
technology transfer in the United States); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10,
at 280 (noting that performance metrics based on revenue and numbers
distort the decision-making process of technology transfer staff); Arti K. Rai &
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a tendency to forget (at best) or ignore that these
breakthroughs resulted from an entire innovation ecosystem,
and the problem is exacerbated by companies, investors, and
politicians that also expect “home runs.”
According to a 2004 study by the Association of University
Technology Managers, the most recent of its studies to present
this data, only about one-third of participating universities
(66/187) had one or more licenses that produced more than $1
million in income in 2004.115 Less than two percent of
participating universities (3/187) had ten or more licenses that
produced $1 million in income in 2004.116 According to
research by two noted authorities on technology transfer—
Marie Thursby, Ph.D., who holds the Hal and John Smith
Chair in Entrepreneurship at the Georgia Institute of
Technology and is executive director of the University’s
TI:GER® program discussed later, and Jerry Thursby, who
holds the Ernest Scheller, Jr. Chair in Innovation,
Entrepreneurship, and Commercialization at Georgia Tech—
only forty percent of disclosures lead to licenses, and fewer than
half of those generate any income.117 They also found that, on
average, the top five income generating licenses were
responsible for about seventy-six percent of total licensing
income.118
It is simply not possible or realistic to consistently expect
that the university can predict such “home runs,” a
complaint/reality that predates passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
This does not mean that such revenue is not worth pursuing.
This is, after all, real money and it provides real opportunities,
even if amounts at a given university may not rise to the level
of materiality in the typical research university’s budget.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 306 (2003) (asserting that technology transfer
office personnel “see their primary job as bringing in licensing revenue,” an
important criteria by which their performance is assessed); Carl Schramm,
Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization, Address to the
Intellectual Property Commercialization and Research Spinouts Conference 4
(Nov. 4, 2004).
115. AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 26.
116. Id. Very few universities make money from commercialization. See
WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 169; Bagley, supra note 51, at 234; Nelson,
supra note 75, at 17 (citing the myth that universities can expect a lot of
money from patenting and licensing).
117. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 190.
118. Id.
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Some might suggest that universities should focus on
trying to identify and pursue their top five revenue generating
innovations. If the sole goal is money, they might be right, but
chasing elusive financial “home runs” risk losing what could be
important opportunities for “base hits” that advance human
welfare and generate profit in smaller increments, but
potentially larger aggregates. Even worse, research results that
could be the equivalent of human welfare “home runs” gather
cobwebs.
Keeping monetary gains in perspective helps
universities prioritize better and operate more consistently
with federal policy.119 It also reduces the risk of criticism that
overall university missions are managed by venture capitalists.
Monetary results should be pursued under the right
circumstances and as part of an overall strategy—rather than
as the strategy.120

119. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 31, at 141; Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at
30 (citing the idea of managing licensing portfolio as a set of options, not
individual wagers on “winner-takes-all” projects); Strandburg, supra note 49,
at 97 (noting that it is impossible to predict which research will lead to
important, or even revolutionary, advances, ensuring that they occur depends
on having a broad portfolio of research investments); see also PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (encouraging a volume model instead of a
“home run” or income model to approach negotiation of technology rights);
Crow, supra note 13, at 24 (explaining that a strategic objective Arizona State
University for its advancing innovation efforts is to focus on “deal flow density
rather than revenue” and in “the number of investions and discoveries
actually moved into use, instated of trying to maximize near term income from
fewer, bigger deals”).
120. See WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 156 (“More and more, our nation’s
leading universities are behaving in ways that suggest money is what
ultimately guides their decision making.”). In dealing with for profit
enterprises, it is arguably mandated by law that tax exempt universities elicit
at least fair market value from for profit enterprises in order to protect against
allegations of private benefit and/or that they are serving other than
charitable purposes. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 664–65; see also
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 72 (universities must operate
within the parameters of Federal and State rules, including “non-profit tax
rules”).
In September 2008, the Internal Revenue Service sent a “Compliance
Questionnaire” to approximately 400 colleges and universities in the United
States.
In the Questionnaire, among other things, the IRS asks for
information about university policies regarding transactions with related
organizations and revenue generated from royalties, exclusive use contracts,
commercial research, patents, copyrights and trade names or trade secrets.
See Internal Revenue Service, Compliance Questionnaire Colleges and
Universities, Form 14018, 6, 11–19 (Sep. 2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/sample_cucp_questionnaire.pdf.
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4. Risk Allocation and Failure Rates
Universities that successfully advance their innovations
understand the extent to which industry takes risks, too. Often,
university innovations are at a stage of development where
there is a high degree of technical and, especially, market
uncertainty.121 As a result, firms and investors frequently need
to expend more time and money conducting research and
In one of her reports for Congress, Schacht
testing.122
estimates that research accounts for only twenty-five percent of
the expense associated with commercializing a new good or
In another, she reports that $1 of academic
service.123
innovation requires about $10,000 of private capital to bring
the innovation to market.124 Presumably, the university has
proven the concept or theory, but others frequently must
advance the concept or theory toward marketable stages.125
It is possible that these additional expenditures could be
lost. After all, not every idea is a good idea, and good ideas are
not always marketable at a given time.126 Unless a pure
121. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 16; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra
note 19, at 165, 167; Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 190 (only seven
percent of licensed technologies ready for practical or commercial use); id. at
204 (university research years away from potential revenue); Bagley, supra
note 51, at 247, 250, 264 (university inventions disclosed at an very early
stage with uncertain commercial potential and uncertain viability); Nelson,
supra note 75, at 15–16 (uses for embryonic inventions are too wide, gains are
too uncertain, and path to practical use is long and poorly mapped). But see
Markman et al., supra note 11, at 250–54 (seventy-two percent of surveyed
technology transfer offices use licensing for cash as their principal strategy
where technologies are at the prototype stage for which the market has been
identified).
122. See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 168; Siegel, supra note 30,
at 123; Pulsinelli, supra note 79, at 412 (development costs typically greatly
exceeding research costs).
123. SCHACHT, 33527, supra note 1, at 3; see also SCHACHT, 32076, supra
note 2, at 4 (“Studies indicate that research funding accounts for
approximately one-quarter of the costs associated with brining a new product
to market.”).
124. SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4.
125. See Schramm, supra note 114, at 4.
126. A case in point is the example of portable, rapid anthrax detection and
Midwest Research Institute in Kansas City, Missouri (“MRI”). MRI developed
technology to efficiently detect airborne anthrax particles. While this seemed
like a good idea, it was not marketable at the time of development. Decades
after development, but only a few years ago, terrorists used the mail to
contaminate facilities with anthrax. Suddenly, a dormant good idea became
marketable and MRI responded quickly to make the technology available. This
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human welfare approach is worth the financial cost—and it
may not be for most for-profit enterprises—business is most
often looking for opportunities to recapture its investment and
then some.
These are market realities, and they
understandably encumber thinking in a market context.
However, this thinking should not be used to excuse failure to
pursue the non-economic benefits of university research,
particularly when there is a growing trend of private
foundations, wealthy individuals, and social enterprises
focusing on maximizing broader potential and benefits.127
In their survey of entrepreneurs and business, Siegel and
his colleagues report that the most frequent complaint from
entrepreneurs is the university’s lack of understanding of the
business,128 which could include its risks, needs, and cultures.
Of course, Siegel also points out that the most frequent
complaint from researchers, university administrators, and
technology transfer personnel was that industry did not
understand university culture, needs, and risks.129
While the university does take some limited risks, it can
dramatically enhance negotiations and relationships when the
university and its personnel understand the nature of the risks
business is taking, including the high degree of market failures
for even good ideas. This understanding should influence the
university’s vision and expectations, and it should inform
behavior, including the terms of transfer documents associated
with valuation and pricing, intellectual property strategies, and
allocating liability.
5. Personnel
Universities with reputations for advancing their
innovations also seem to have the right personnel with the
right skills in the right positions, whether as researchers,
administrators, or advancing innovation professionals.130 For
type of convergence does not always occur but being prepared for its
possibilities can be both smart and worthwhile. Telephone interview with Dr.
James Spigarelli, President & Chief Executive Officer, Midwest Research Inst.
(Oct. 27, 2009); Telephone interview with Jeanie Latz, former Gen. Counsel &
Corp. Sec’y, Midwest Research Inst. (Oct. 9, 2006).
127. See discussion infra note 166 and accompanying text.
128. Siegel, supra note 30, at 118 (tbl.2); SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at
31.
129. Siegel, supra note 30, at 118 (tbl.2).
130. Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 2 (asserting that technology transfer
effectiveness ultimately depends on competencies of the people involved—
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instance, universities must be wary of turning excellent
researchers into only half-way decent entrepreneurs,131 and in
doing so possibly sacrificing quality innovation in pursuit of
mediocre business.
Such universities also actively pursue “cross-pollination”
and “bundling” among researchers and institutions and across
fields and boundaries with the expectation and result that
innovation is more likely to occur with interdisciplinary
programs than in the silos that normally exist.132 For instance,
Stanford University has a program jointly run by the
engineering and medical schools that forms teams of four from
among their recent graduates.133 These teams then immerse
themselves in Stanford’s hospital.134 After two months, they
are expected to make three hundred suggestions for
improvement either in the practice of medicine or in
administration.135 Teams of medical personnel or engineers
alone, without the benefit of the “cross pollination,” may not be
likely to find three hundred suggestions and the quality of the
suggestions would likely be lower.
Georgia Tech established an interdisciplinary program it
calls TI:GER—Technical Innovation: Generating Economic
In this program, Georgia Tech places Ph.D.
Results.136
students in science and engineering on teams with MBA and
law students.137 The goals of the program are to graduate
technically proficient science and engineering Ph.D.s who have
a multidisciplinary perspective, to produce thesis research of
scientific merit and market relevance, and to expose MBA and
scientists, entrepreneurs, technology transfer personnel, administration—and
their incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activity).
131. See NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 12 (universities’ primary tasks
are research and education).
132. See id. at 50; Libecap, supra note 34, at xviii (citing the Stanford
experience to demonstrate the importance of integrating interdisciplinary
programs); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 34 (one
experience common to the successful university-industry partnerships studied
was the “cross fertilization of individuals with experience in government,
academic, or industrial sectors”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12,
at 37–63 (discussing various university-industry and industry-industry
collaboration experiences).
133. SCHRAMM, supra note 26, at 84.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Libecap, supra note 34, at xvii.
137. Thursby, supra note 1, at 212.
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law students to the challenges that arise in fundamental
research and commercialization.138 As these students pursue
careers in managing research and development, intellectual
property law, or leadership in industry or at universities, they
should be better equipped to engage and pursue technology
transfer, hopefully contributing to more effective and more
efficient relationships and processes.
As for personnel responsible for advancing the innovations,
much has been written theorizing about the types of people who
are effective in those roles. Relevant studies approach the
issue based on surveys of people from business, administration,
researchers, and technology transfer office personnel. Even
though based on subjective reporting, there seems to be a
certain amount of reasonable advice that can be extrapolated
from the research.139
Reminiscent of Barbási’s research cited earlier, European
researchers identify the critical skill for technology transfer
personnel as one of “building bridges” between university
researchers and business.140 Others, such as Siegel and his
colleagues, have similarly identified networking skills as
critical and have characterized the role as “boundary
spanners.”141 A related sub-specialty, if you will, is the role of
recognizing opportunities or at least building connections and
networks to serve this fundamental entrepreneurial
prerequisite.142
In order to do this, those in advancing innovation must
simultaneously earn and build trust from the researchers and
from those in business143—a significant but surmountable
challenge even with the sometimes competing and even
mutually exclusive philosophies and perspectives of each.
However, it can be done, and there are several ways to
accomplish it. Among those are by regular interactions,
demonstrated efforts to understand perspectives, tangible
attempts to pursue outcomes that motivate, and appropriate

138. Id. at 217.
139. See infra notes 140––146.
140. CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 65, 76.
141. Siegel, supra note 30, at 122; Siegel, supra note 31, at 121; see also
Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 4, 34.
142. Siegel, supra note 31, at 121; Schramm, supra note 114, at 6.
143. See GOVERNMENT-UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ROUNDTABLE,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. ET AL., OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO COLLABORATIVE
RESEARCH: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 2 (1999).
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respect for and implementation of ethical behavior. Some have
suggested that earning trust may be the most important factor
for technology transfer personnel, but trust is much less a
single characteristic than a coalescing of the right combination
of character, skill, experience, and networks. Trust also takes
time to build and maintain, unless the people in or hired to the
positions have already earned the requisite levels and types of
trust by reputation.
The European researchers also identify a core set of skills
that they suggest should be taught in formal courses. The
skills run a significant gamut and include business
development, intellectual property management, negotiating,
networking, contracting, coaching, finance, and others.144
While it may be impossible to find any one person who
possesses these diverse skills at a high performance level,
certainly the right team of people could be found with
complementary skills.
The Muenster University of Applied Sciences in Germany
took a different route. They appointed a marketing expert as
director of technology transfer rather than a lawyer,
entrepreneur, engineer, bureaucrat, or scientist.145 At the time
of his appointment, he was the only European director whose
core competency was marketing.146
There is an even more fundamental issue as it relates to
personnel for the advancing innovation office. These offices
and efforts should have an appropriate number of qualified
people and sufficient resources.
Frequently, technology
transfer offices are understaffed and their resources (and jobs)
are based on the revenue they generate. Both factors motivate
personnel to focus excessively on money, including devoting
scarce attention only to those innovations that are most likely
to raise the most revenue. In the process, one-size-fits-all
approaches become normal, potentially life altering innovations
can be ignored, and technology transfer can be perceived as
anathema to, instead of complementary of, academia. Actual
staffing and resources for the technology transfer office say
more about the university administration’s philosophy
regarding innovation and federal policy than any words that
144. CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 65, 76.
145. Interview with Dr. Thomas Baaken, Dir. of Tech. Transfer, Muenster
Univ. of Applied Sciences, in F.R.G., (Oct. 20, 2006).
146. Id.
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might be used.
The right people with the right skills and perspectives can
make or break a transaction, and they can build or inhibit trust
as the foundation of relationships. There is only so much that
the quality of the research or the university’s reputation can do
to compensate for poorly placed and/or under-resourced
personnel. Universities should ensure that their policies and
behavior allow them to recruit and retain the right people for
their vision of advancing innovation, including appropriate
measures of and rewards for successfully implementing the
university’s vision and federal policy.
V. POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR CONSISTENT WITH AND
DERIVED FROM A VISION FOR ADVANCING
INNOVATION
One of the biggest challenges all universities face in their
efforts to advance innovation is sculpting a culture of
innovation using the right policies and behaviors and changing
Even
those that are counterproductive or outdated.147
Stanford, which is frequently mentioned as among the best,
had to recognize that its policies and behavior may have been
inhibiting efforts to advance its innovations.148 Two anecdotes
from my experience as a practicing lawyer illustrate some of
the typical policy and behavioral challenges. Of course, not all
of my experiences have been inappropriately difficult or
unnecessarily time consuming or expensive, and positive
experiences also are instructive in assessing university policies
and behaviors.
A client wanted to donate a worthwhile innovation to a
university. It took nearly nine months for my client to give
that innovation away as we worked through four different
147. Gordon, supra note 97, at 672 (“[T]he challenge for each university is
to structure the most beneficial commercialization program for its
organization, balancing its needs and its mission of benefiting the public and
its students with its technology commercialization efforts.”); see Crow, supra
note 13, at 26 (Arizona State University has “instituted a number of
institutional policies that promote entrepreneurship and make it easy to move
ideas into action, consistent with the policies mentioned earlier relating to
intellectual property commercialization. Conversely, policies that discourage
entrepreneurial behavior are minimized”).
148. See TORNATZKY, supra note 2, at 160 (citing a 1995 faculty survey
that reported “Stanford is perceived as one of the worst American universities
to deal with, especially on the topic of ownership/patent status of intellectual
property”).
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offices at the university–legal, technology transfer, risk
management, and administration.
We struggled through
inconsistent positions among them with regard to such
considerations as liability exposure, export control compliance,
and representations and warranties. We also had to deal with
the university’s desire that my client indemnify the university
for its activities in exploiting the innovation. With regard to
the last point, my client accepted responsibility for the
originality of and non-infringement by the underlying
intellectual property, but the university wanted my client to
indemnify it for liability the university might incur as a direct
result of actions by the university or within its control. We
finally completed the transaction, but the journey was more
arduous, time consuming, and expensive than it needed to be.
In another instance, a client wanted to license software
from a university’s for-profit subsidiary. My client decided to
forgo alternative—possibly better—providers specifically in
part to help this entity gain credibility and traction in the
marketplace. Among other problems, the university wanted my
client to indemnify it if its software was deemed infringing. In
addition, the university wanted to control and use all of the
data collected using the software. Other negotiating challenges
included what my client believed to be the entity’s inflated view
of the software’s financial value and a lack of understanding of
(or desire to learn about) essential legally mandated
restrictions peculiar to my client’s business. Although we
eventually negotiated the issues to a mutually agreeable end,
everyone involved agreed that the process was more convoluted
and difficult than it needed to be.
In both of the above circumstances, the universities
involved prided themselves on their vision for advancing
innovation, but their policies and behavior inhibited
implementing that vision. Additionally, and as often seems to
be the case, the above universities appeared to approach the
transactions without regard to the specific circumstances, and
they instead seemed to blindly apply generally held positions,
even though inapplicable.
A. POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR: LEGAL TOPICS
Among the legal topics that most impact the intersection of
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university policy and behavior are conflicts of interest,149
intellectual property, liability, representations and warranties,
export controls, and compliance with laws and regulations of
the United States concerning tax exempt or governmental
status. Too frequently, universities may try to adopt one-sizefits-all approaches to these multi-faceted and frequently
complex legal issues.
Such behavior often may involve
wholesale adaptations of something that is perceived to have
worked for a different institution, or they may be broad-based
extrapolations of something that happened to work in a unique,
but unrelated, situation. This can result in blanket practices
such as “never” indemnifying, “always” requiring that the
university be fully indemnified (even for its own actions), and
“never” making certain representations regarding originality or
non-infringement.
Blanket practices usually seem to be implemented with the
expectation or hope that they will streamline licensing, result
in greater efficiency, and ultimately save money.
Unfortunately, such practices, when applied rigidly and
without analysis or exception, can interfere with licensing and
increase the time and financial cost. They can also be a
disincentive to begin negotiations because of their effect in
shifting risk and responsibility away from the university, even
in cases when the university is in the best (and sometimes only)
position to control the risk. Such generic approaches and onesided practices usually run counter to and undermine federal
policy and a purported vision that extols the virtues of
advancing innovation.
When inflexible practices are accompanied by a
corresponding expectation that licensees also will pay high fees
or make other compromises, the result can be disequilibrium,
time consuming and costly negotiations, stagnating
innovations, and frequently higher transaction and research
costs.150 Protecting the university is important, but so is
allowing society to benefit from the innovations harbored in
university labs. This is not to say that universities should be
149. See discussion supra notes 35–65 and accompanying text.
150. See Baca, supra note 92, at *1 (transaction costs increase research
costs and slow the pace of scientific progress); id. at *20, *24, *26 (protracted
negotiations can be costly and time consuming and can cause the loss of
research windows and grant opportunities and delays in progress and real
science); Rai & Eisenberg¸ supra note 114, at 297 (transaction costs can mount
quickly); Pulsinelli, supra note 79, at 431–32 (costs and delays in agreeing to
license have an adverse impact on the research enterprise).
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reckless or that they should not protect themselves; however,
advancing innovation efforts would be significantly enhanced
with legal practices and behavior that better balance university
responsibility and fees with the actual benefits and allocation
of risk, and the ability to manage that risk. Striking the right
balance along the continuum is worth the struggle, particularly
in the areas of intellectual property and liability.151
1. Intellectual Property
The universities best at advancing innovation understand
that there are a variety of options when addressing intellectual
property issues regarding ownership, exclusivity, use rights,
and other matters.152 They also understand that different
innovations may warrant different strategies; different stages
of development afford varying degrees of leverage; and different
market demands, risks, and opportunities may justify different
tactics.153
151. See, e.g., PALMINTERA, supra note 29, at ii (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Stanford University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgia
Institute of Technology appear to have found their balance and lead to attract
star faculty and innovative minded students and faculty); Carl J. Schramm,
Five Universities You Can Do Business With, INC. MAGAZINE, Feb. 2006, at 23
(identifying California Institute of Technology, University of California–
Berkeley, Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
University of Wisconsin as having found the right balance); see also
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (identifying intellectual
property negotiations as a “significant barrier and continual challenge” even
among “extremely successful partnerships”).
152. Among questions that might be considered in helping to address
ownership of sponsored research are the following: (1) Who proposed the
project/collaboration in the first place?; (2) Who is paying for it?; (3) Who is
taking the lead to organize the research? Design it? Conduct it?; (4) Is the
research mission critical for university? For industry?; (5) Whose facilities?
Equipment? Personnel?; (6) Will the research or reporting require access to
privileged information of materials?; (7) How does the Project relate to prior
work of industry? University? Researcher?; (8) What are the various
applications/uses? What is the commercial potential? What fields of use? Are
there specific geographic areas that might be more or less interested?; (9) How
does ownership by one party restrict the other? Is there a “knock out effect”?;
and (10) Are there other legal issues, such as contractual limitations, exempt
organizations/IRS issues, etc.? See, CREST REPORT, supra note 50, at 49–53.
153. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 (“[P]rocesses of knowledge
exchange and technology transfer are complex, and the channels through
which these processes operate most effectively differ significantly among
different fields of technology.”); MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 34 (“[T]he
evidence from expert surveys and other sources [] highlights the substantial
differences among industries and fields of research and innovation.”); Arti K.
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Much has been written about inherent differences in the
desirability of patenting, and thereby more vigorously
protecting, the underlying intellectual property of biomedical
and pharmaceutical innovations when compared with advances
in information technology and communication, technologies
where time to market is more critical.154 Much of that
discussion has occurred in the context of trying to document the
Rai et al., University Software Ownership: Technology Transfer or Business As
Usual? 28 (Duke Law Sch. Sci., Tech. and Innovation Research Paper Series,
Research
Paper
No.
20,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=996456 (“Ideally, we would
want decisions about whether to patent publicly-funded academic research to
be based not only on the private marginal costs of patent acquisition but on
whether a patent is needed to facilitate commercialization in a specific case,
which is likely to vary across inventions and fields.”); J. Strother Moore et al.,
Computing Research Ass’n., Best Practices Memo: University-Industry
Sponsored
Research
Agreements
1
(Sept.
2003),
http://www.cra.org/reports/ip/bestpractices.pdf
(distinguishing information
technology from biomedical, pharmaceutical, and agricultural advances such
that universities can introduce significant barriers to cooperation by forcing
information technology into a standard patent-centric form); see also
SCHACHT, 30320, supra note 2, at 3 (distinguishing pharmaceutical and
biochemical areas where patents can be important from electronics, where
they may not be); Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 29 (emphasizing stage of
development and field of emphasis); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 10, at
279 (patent-licensing is one channel and should not be the limited focus of
technology transfer efforts); Markman et al., supra note 11, at 249–55; see also
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 28 (industry is critical of some
universities “for employing the same technology transfer approach for
pharmaceutical- and biotechnology-related discoveries as they use for
information technology inventions”).
154. See Mowery, supra note 30, at 3–4, 22–25; MOWERY ET AL., supra note
19, at 178 (identifying the need to recognize differences among academic
disciplines or research areas with economically significant incentives in
biomedical research, but not as great a need in electronics and other areas),
190–91 (“It is important for university research administrators to adjust their
intellectual property policies to accommodate these intersectoral differences”
which requires “pursuit of a broader and more flexible set of objectives
through patenting and licensing policies, rather than focusing solely on
licensing revenues.”); Moore et al., Computing Research Association, supra
note 137, at 1–2; MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 154, 178, 190–91
(explaining need to recognize differences among academic disciplines or
research areas with economically significant incentives in biomedical research
but not as much in electronics and other areas; “It is important for university
research administrators to adjust their intellectual property policies to
accommodate these intersectoral differences” which requires “pursuit of a
broader, more flexible set of objectives through patenting and licensing
policies, rather than focusing solely on licensing revenues.”); see also
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1,
at 11 (value of intellectual property to various industries is “highly variable”);
SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 4; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 302–
03 (citations omitted).
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effectiveness of the Bayh-Dole Act. However, it should not be
Bayh-Dole that drives universities to patent; it should be the
specific circumstances surrounding the intellectual property in
question. Bayh-Dole gives the freedom to patent and exploit,
but it does not purport to replace judgment about when or
whether to patent or how to exploit. Patenting may be the best
approach when it is essential to preserve a legitimate
competitive advantage, to exploit the invention for substantial
commercial or social gains or both, or to arm against
infringement claims.
Patenting may not be appropriate in other contexts or
sometimes even if the above mentioned factors are present.
Patenting is not the only intellectual property option available
for protecting or exploiting university innovations. The precise
strategies deployed should depend on any number of factors,
including the following:
a. the likely commercial and non-commercial applications
for the innovation, including uses for further research and
exploration;155
b. the possible commercial and social value;
c. the extent to which further development is necessary to
realize potential;
d. the presence of a unique market demand or opportunity
and even if a present or likely future market exists at all;
e. the likely business interests, including ease to replicate
and time to market;156
f. the existing and likely competition, if any;
g. whether protection inhibits or enhances basic
research;157

155. See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 16 (highlighting
the need to balance protecting commercial value against access to tools for
further research and exploration).
156. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11.
157. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 289, 296 (warning that patents on
early stage discoveries can be broad and permit holders to control subsequent
research); Baca, supra note 92, at *20, *24, *26.
[L]ongstanding norms call for relatively unfettered access to
fundamental knowledge developed by prior researchers. . . . The
tradition of open science has eroded considerably over the past
quarter century as proprietary claims have reached farther upstream
from end products to cover fundamental discoveries that provide the
knowledge base for future product development.
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 289.
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h. the effective commercial life for the innovation;158 and
i. the social and other costs associated with a
preservationist approach.
These factors help universities determine whether to
patent, to assign, to license, or to make the innovation freely
available as open source, through publication, or otherwise. If
the university pursues licensing, it then must determine
whether the license should be exclusive or non-exclusive,
limited in time or perpetual, limited in geography, limited to a
particular use, or if the terms and restrictions should vary
depending on whether the use is for commercial, academic
research, or charitable purposes.159
Part of the difficulty is that none of these decision factors
happens in a vacuum, and it is unrealistic and even
counterproductive to follow the adage—as economists are fond
of saying—”all else being equal.” Frequently, there are real
risks, expenses, and opportunity costs that also must be
considered. All too often, there also are limited financial and
human resources available within the university to provide the
depth of analysis of these factors to make the most informed
decision. These realities become even starker when university
leadership and its advisors over-emphasize monetary gains and
engender an over-developed fear of giving away too much. As a
result, it sometimes becomes too easy to default to a “one-sizefits-all”
approach
to
intellectual
property,
even
unintentionally.160
Uniform approaches can help ensure that the university
pursues core positions on various contractual, economic, and
liability matters.
Templates and forms can expedite
transactions if the underlying terms are generally reasonable
158. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It
the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 66
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) (“What matters is the effective life, that is, the
time until the noninfringing substitute appears.
The effective life is
determined by patent scope or leading breadth, which is interpreted as the
minimum quality improvement that avoids infringement.”) (citation omitted).
159. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 191; Moore et al., supra note 127, at
2.
160. Siegel Study, supra note 29, at 33–35 (indentifying that the industry
reports dissatisfaction with university technology transfer office marketing
and negotiation skills and lack of business skills and expertise, both of which,
they complain, cause university to focus too narrowly on a small set of
technical areas, be too concerned about legal aspects of licensing, and cause
universities to exercise intellectual property rights too aggressively given the
circumstances).

TYLER.WEB

194

2/20/2009 4:18:10 PM

MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:1

and context-appropriate. They also can facilitate clarity and
consistency; after all, not every transaction needs every detail
to be negotiated.
Creative commons, science commons,
varieties of open source, and other resources can help in those
circumstances.
Unfortunately, uniform strategies for
intellectual property can over-protect the underlying
innovation, and they can instill a false sense of entrenchment
that delays the university in changing core positions when
Agreement may eventually be
circumstances dictate.161
reached, but frequently those involved are frustrated and have
devoted too much time and money.
That perspective can lead to difficult, unwieldy, and time
consuming negotiations that increase costs for all involved,
another complaint that has survived from the pre-Bayh-Dole
era. Those costs are part of the calculus that business and
other potential “buyers” (including other universities) will use
to determine if it is worthwhile to pursue a relationship.162
Ironically, transaction costs that are beyond what is reasonable
can undermine the university’s revenue motive because of
expenses incurred and opportunities lost.
Consequently, the one-size-fits-all approach too frequently
leads to negative situations, each of which may undermine
advancing innovation efforts generally.163 First, researchers
may circumvent the university and directly approach acquirers,
161. See BOK, supra note 31, at 141; SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 29–
30; Siegel, supra note 30, at 123; WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 191
(“[Universities] ‘want the big payoff . . . but they don’t want to take any risk.’”)
(quoting Thomas Burger, vice president for corporate development at Genta
Inc.); WASHBURN, supra note 47, at 193 (“[U]niversities . . . overestimat[e] the
commercial value of their inventions, and [take an] aggressive stance in
licensing negotiations.”) (citing 1991 GUIRR study on industry perspectives).
162. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 15–17; see also MOWERY ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 84 (noting the high cost of patent management and its effect
on potential financial return); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11,
13 (cautioning institutions to beware of time and costs incurred to execute
agreements, as they are “not inconsequential” and need to be reduced).
163. E.g.,Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 158, at 67 (recognizing the
debate that intellectual property policies “can stifle innovation and slow
progress”) (citation omitted) (1990); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra
note 12, at 1, 4, 33 (“there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach for creating a
successful research partnership” or for “strengthening connection points
between parties”). But see Crow, supra note 13 at 24 (“Arizona State
University has developed licensing templates and master sponsored research
agreements, which can reduce the need to negotiate over terms and
conditions”).
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licensees, or investors. Furthermore, they might even leave the
university. Second, innovations may stagnate. Finally, the
university may implement inflexible policies and behaviors that
sometimes may work, sometimes inhibit, and frequently are
not conducive to advancing innovation. In the first instance,
the university may lose out on opportunities. In the latter two
instances, both the university and society lose the benefits that
might be available from the research outcomes. None of these
results are desirable.
Some advocate that all university innovations should be
given away freely and without reservation or charge. In certain
instances, this or other open system approaches may be
appropriate, and they should be considered as a legitimate
strategic alternative for select innovations, particularly when
open collaborations and open innovation systems present
opportunities to solve research challenges and more rapidly
advance innovations to address problems in society.164
However, as a blanket, wholesale, one-size-fits-all approach to
all university advances, the nearly 100-year-old observations of
Frank Gardner Cotrell, one of the visionaries and founders of
The Research Corporation, remains valid: innovations that
could better the human condition have not reached fruition
when given away freely because there is no financial return to
be expected to justify the additional expenditure and risk.165
Importantly, increased engagement by private foundations,
wealthy individuals, and public charities dedicated to research
in certain areas, including through grants, program related
investments, and direct investment, could result in more
significant opportunities and capital needed for development
and distribution.166
164. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 3. Among the
factors that a university might consider in making innovations freely available
are the nature of the innovation and the nature of the proposed use. For
instance, it might be appropriate to make certain software, technology, and
even pharmaceutical or biomedical advances broadly available in order to
encourage and speed up their further development and commercialization.
Also, it might be appropriate to charge for certain innovations but make them
freely available when used for purposes of educational or scientific research.
165. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 59 (“[A] number of meritorious
patents given to the public absolutely freely by their inventors have never
come upon the market chiefly because ‘what is everybody’s business is
nobody’s business.’”) (quoting F.G. Cottrell, The Research Corporation, an
Experiment in the Public Administration of Patent Rights, 4 J. INDUS. &
ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 864, 865 (1912)).
166. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1, 5 (acknowledging
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As a matter of implementing federal policy, universities
that succeed in advancing their innovations usually have
already considered many of these alternatives, have connected
with appropriate expertise, and are efficient at prioritizing and
allocating resources to make the innovations as available as
possible whether through patents, licenses, open source,
publication, or other routes.
2. Liability, Representations and Warranties, Indemnity
Liability, indemnification, and sovereign immunity can be
among the hardest and most difficult issues to address when
advancing university innovations.
Principles of academic
freedom and the purported inability to control faculty and to
provide oversight or demand accountability are regular
justifications for “never” making representations or warranties
about originality or non-infringement, or “always” diluting
these provisions.
Universities also rely on these same
principles and claimed inabilities to assert that they “never”
indemnify or defend even for their own behavior.167
Many institutions promulgate these default positions
despite being in the best position to monitor researcher
activities, obtain representations and warranties from the
researcher, and impose meaningful remedies against the
researcher in case of breach. Moreover, universities frequently
receive additional amounts—sometimes substantial—as part of
grants to cover administrative costs, some part of which could
be used to monitor or supervise researchers enough to provide
It can be
proper representations and warranties.168
trend of increased involvement by private foundations funding research,
particularly in medicine and healthcare); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200603031 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/0603031.pdf. A few high profile examples include the various activities
and strategies of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Michael J. Fox
Foundation for Parkinson’s Research, Milken Family Foundation, Prostate
Cancer Foundation, the Omidyar Network, Google Foundation, Faster Cures,
and others.
167. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1405 (quoting the President
of the University of Utah in 1994 as asserting that it would be “an impossible
and self-defeating approach” for universities to monitor the actions and
veracity of its faculty).
168. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 10, at 1405–06 (stating that
taxpayers can legitimately expect universities to “comply not only with correct
font on a cover page, but also proper monitoring, including at the
departmental level where fellow researchers and department chairs are most
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disconcerting when a university is not willing to support its
own personnel, who are presumably motivated by academic
integrity, reputation, job security, future job prospects, and/or
even pecuniary interest. A university suggesting that industry
or a licensee university should obtain representations,
warranties, and protections from the researcher are little or no
comfort, especially when the licensor will not rely on the
researcher in the first instance.
In essence, universities that take these types of positions
seem to want the benefits of the research, frequently paid for
by others, without the responsibility or risk associated with
what it takes to achieve those benefits. Not only might they try
to actively shift that responsibility and risk to others but they
also frequently refuse to compensate the other party for their
increased exposure by reducing fees or royalty rates, or altering
use rights or other restrictions to better account for the shifted
risk.
Ultimately, universities have an abiding interest in
protecting reputations and relationships. A university with a
reputation for permitting infringing material or content may
suffer educational consequences because they will have
difficulty attracting and retaining high quality faculty and
students, and the non-economic benefits of university
relationships with industry are jeopardized. They may also
suffer economically, through lost tuition revenue, sponsored
research opportunities, and even charitable donations, and
relationships with industry and community will suffer,
resulting in lost contributions.
Consequently, universities are concerned about ensuring
originality, non-infringement, and other legal compliance—
Universities do have
regardless of the circumstances.169
recourse when confronted with evidence of plagiarism, fraud,
harassment, or any number of other behaviors that offend
ethical, moral, or legal standards. Despite objections from
academia based on academic freedom or lack of control or
oversight, universities are able to mete out consequences when
they have the will to do so.170
likely to be able to vouch for their colleagues with some knowledge and
confidence”).
169. See CREST Report, supra note 18, at 19 (good technology transfer
offices “define, secure, and document the rights to background knowledge” and
“obtain written assignments from students and researchers”).
170. See Jaschik, supra note 71 (academic panel found faculty member
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As a practical matter, refusing to provide certain
customary representations or warranties or to indemnify or
defend against harm caused by their own behavior may not
alter the university’s exposure much. The absence of these
provisions in a contract may save the university from
responsibility to a licensee, but the university may still be
liable directly to an injured party for infringement, tort, or
otherwise where joint and several liability may be its only
remaining shield. Meanwhile, the university’s reputation and
relationships may suffer in at least two meaningful ways: first,
because it tolerated the infringing behavior or unethical
research; and second, for its positions in negotiating the license
and trying to shift responsibility for its behavior. In the end,
the university may still be financially liable to the same degree
as if its contract included the representations and warranties
and/or the duties to indemnify and defend. However, its
economic damages may be greater because of the damage to
reputation and relationships.
As a result, attempts by
universities to justify intransigence on liability issues by
invoking academic freedom, lack of control, or administrative
costs generally are strained, except possibly for statutory
mandates relating to sovereign immunity.
Principles of sovereign immunity and corresponding
legislation often dictate what state universities can or cannot
do in making representations, warranties and covenants, or in
agreeing to indemnify or defend.
With regard to originality and non-infringement, these
matters are normally addressed in representations and
warranties. Absent waiver, however, sovereign immunity
protects states and their subdivisions, including universities,
from liability for infringing another’s intellectual property
This is not a level playing field for private
rights.171
universities, who must develop their negotiating strategies
(including price) to consider their exposure to infringement
claims by the licensee and third parties. As a result, private
universities are less able to decrease pricing or demonstrate
guilty of plagiarism and other charges but divided about punishment); Knight
& Austen, supra note 71, at 203 (about forty percent of complaints resulted in
some action to redress misconduct such as plagiarism or harassment).
171. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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flexibility in other ways because of the exposure they must
account for.
Public universities are freer to disregard
intellectual property rights, which could make dealing with
public universities more expensive for the licensees.
In
addition, it may be argued that the lack of consequences for
infringement by state institutions decreases their motivation to
appropriately monitor their researchers.
The advantages that sovereign immunity affords public
universities are not limited to infringement. They may also
rely on this doctrine in a products liability context. Although
affording additional protections to the public university,
sovereign immunity can be a disadvantage if there is
reluctance to license innovations from such institutions because
of the increased liability exposure to the licensee.
Compromises to sovereign immunity that would create
limited exposure and reforms in liability exposure of private
universities and licensees could facilitate usefulness of
university innovations. For instance, setting aside sovereign
immunity or permitting degrees to hold harmless agreements
to allocate some risk to the university can encourage greater
accountability regarding researchers and can provide some
financial comfort to licensees. Additionally, the exposure could
be capped except in the case of gross negligence or intentional
or willful misconduct. After all, some degrees of liability
exposure can impose accountability and inhibit recklessness.
Similar provisions could help protect private universities that
act in good faith and level the playing field for public and
private institutions.
Because of the amounts of federal money involved in
supporting research and its distribution without regard to the
character of an institution as private or public, a federal policy
that desires maximal utilization and commercialization would
oppose broad application of sovereign immunity as a deterrent
to proper allocation of risk and a deterrent to expedited
advancement of university innovation. Reforms along these
lines could provide a degree of certainty to universities and
industry (and their respective insurers) that would help better
quantify risk, more concretely defines potential consequences,
and still ensures that injured parties are not left without
recourse.
As it stands now, principles of sovereign immunity may not
be negotiable in many circumstances but only to the degree to
which the principles apply. Unfortunately, there have been
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instances borne of misunderstanding, ignorance or desire to
deceive to overstate the actual degree to which the public
university is immune, including by mischaracterizing
university policy (from which they may deviate) as covered by
sovereign immunity (from which they may not, depending on
the state). Such mischaracterizations can negatively influence
the university’s credibility and integrity, whether in acquiring
innovations, sponsoring research, or even making donations.
In addressing these challenging issues, successful
universities do not segregate them from other issues. They
recognize that relationships exist among and between
negotiated topics. For instance, the monetary value of the
intellectual property rights being granted may be less than
otherwise expected in the absence of the university’s ability to
provide satisfactory representations and warranties or to
address liability, indemnity, and related issues. There may be
other ways to creatively compensate for the increased risk that
the university is shifting to the licensee or assignee, such as
permitting a longer term, favoring exclusivity or loosening
certain conditions associated with exclusivity, broadening the
geographic scope, allowing alternative media of expression and
uses, and expanding rights regarding derivative works.
Unfortunately, many of these opportunities can be lost because
of how universities sometimes staff negotiations.
Clarity of responsibility for decision-making on these and
other legal topics can be critical, and its absence can inhibit
advancing innovation efforts. As noted in one of the examples
at the beginning of this section, transactions around advancing
university innovations can involve multiple arms of the
university with frequently disparate, unilateral views but
unclear means for reconciling these views. This bureaucracy
can permit people to abdicate responsibility or inhibit the
ability to make decisions, absent time consuming consensus
building. This behavior and competing policy perspectives can
be as frustrating to the university’s personnel as it is to those
with whom it negotiates.
Clear authority should be vested appropriately, ideally in
one person who is knowledgeable and readily accessible for
negotiations, so that such person can assess the risks and
benefits associated with various options and circumstances,
and she or he can make legal, business, and practical decisions.
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B. POLICY AND BEHAVIOR: PRACTICAL TOPICS
There are at least two practical topics that can reflect more
broadly on how a university satisfies federal policy and
contractual obligations to advance its innovations: disclosures
and measuring efforts.
1. Disclosures
Disclosures to technology transfer offices of inventions,
innovations, technologies, discoveries, etc., are the foundation
of the university’s advancing innovation programs. People
responsible for such programs must know about the
innovations available for transfer. Unfortunately, not enough
innovations with commercial or other useful potential are
disclosed.172
The following chart shows information reported to the
Association of University and Technology Transfer, the
affiliation group for technology transfer personnel, about
researcher disclosures, new patent applications by universities,
and patents issued to universities for 2004, 2005, and 2006.173

Disclosures
New Patent
Applications
Patents Issued

2004
16,871
10,517

2005
17,382
10,270

2006
18,874
11,622

3,680

3,278

3,255

According to a study by Jerry and Marie Thursby, sixtyfour percent of faculty surveyed made no disclosures during the
years studied, and about fifteen percent made disclosures in
only one year within those studied.174 Therefore, only twentyone percent of surveyed faculty made disclosures in two or more
of the years studied. It is hard to believe that there are not
more innovations that should be disclosed. More should be
done to encourage and facilitate such disclosures.
Universities can increase disclosures by implementing
172. See Thursby, supra note 1, at 214. See infra note 176 for a chart
representing information reported to the Association of University and
Technology Transfer, the affiliation group for technology transfer personnel,
about researcher disclosures, new patent applications by universities, and
patents issued to universities in 2004, 2005, and 2006.
174. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 200.
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policies and pursuing behavior that motivates and removes
barriers to disclosure.175 Research suggests that scientists and
researchers are motivated by professional prestige and
recognition;176 monetary rewards that lead to better equipment,
facilities, support and availability for research opportunities;177
licensing potential and money for their own personal use;178 the
propagation, dissemination, and exchange of ideas;179 access to
platforms for testing their ideas;180 constructive changes in the
curricula;181 advances in benefits to human welfare;182 and even
enhanced job prospects for their students.183
It is not necessarily a novel suggestion that those involved
should appeal to these motivating influences by including
rewards for behavior consistent with the desired goals for
175. See Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 3, 25; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
2008, supra note 12, at 21 (“Misalignment of incentive systems and a lack of
transparency can create barriers for university-private sector research
partnerships.”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 21
(universities should connect outputs to incentive systems for faculty,
technology transfer office personnel and administrators); PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 34 (encouraging flexibility in tenure
processes to acknowledge the importance of and commitment of time to
university-industry relationships); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12,
at 35 (tenure decisions often fail to recognize critical factors other than
publications and Federal grant money; technology transfer personnel should
be assessed on their value added or volume of products or knowledge moved
instead of revenue generated; and recognizing need for Federal agencies and
universities to provide incentives for “industry participation, entrepreneurship
activities and fostering State and local involvement”).
176. SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 22, at 10–11, 49 tbl.1; see also TORNATZKY
ET AL., supra note 19, at 19 (stating that universities with external economic
and industry partners often reward faculty involvement with these partners
with acknowledgment and accolades).
177. Siegel, supra note 30, at 130; NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43;
SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 31; see also Strandburg, supra note 49, at 95
(at the margin, scientists more likely to respond to opportunities for greater
scientific productivity and autonomy than wealth).
178. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43; see also SIEGEL STUDY, supra
note 29, at 32.
179. See Siegel & Phan, supra note 35, at 5; see also Siegel, supra note 30,
at 130 (finding that technology transfer improves university scientists’
research through access to the ideas of industry scientists).
180. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43.
181. See Siegel, supra note 23, at 130.
182. See NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43 (“[University] researchers are
more driven by research than money.”); see also id. at 28 (noting that a factor
motivating Japanese researchers is putting research to practical use to benefit
society).
183. NILSSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 43; Libecap, supra note 27, at ix.
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technology transfer programs. Some rewards seem fairly easy
to implement, such as promoting publication and
presentations,184 adopting generous standards for sharing
royalties, license fees, and equity stakes in companies,185 or
recognizing in tenure and promotion the validity of disclosures,
patents and other behavior that advances technology
Most universities seem to implement some
transfer.186
combination of these to varying degrees, but greater efforts are
needed.
At the same time, universities should address perceived
barriers to disclosure, including threats to academic integrity,
concern that disclosure may take time and energy away from
research, and fear that disclosure may require researchers to
become
enmeshed
in
bureaucratic,
inefficient,
and
uncomfortable patenting, licensing and commercializing
processes.187
In addition, when university leaders overtly focus on
revenue, researchers may believe that they will not receive
meaningful attention equivalent to their efforts, unless
disclosing an obviously lucrative innovation. As a result,
researchers may refrain from disclosing innovations that are
not clear financial home runs because they believe doing so will
be unlikely to matter. Those realities and perceptions can
change if university behavior changes.
Incentives and disincentives for disclosure and university
approaches to them can be among the best evidence of whether
universities prioritize advancing their innovations and
fulfilling their federal policy obligations. To some degree, game
184. See SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 10–11 (asserting that publication
and conference presentations are primary motives for university scientists);
see also TORNATZKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 53, 89 (citing practices of North
Carolina State University and Purdue University). But see id. at 166 (citing
practices at Stanford University).
185. See SIEGEL STUDY, supra note 29, at 32.
186. See id. But see Philip M. Pizzo, M.D., Panel Discussion: Research,
Innovation, and Safety: Doing the Right Thing, 74 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED.
(SUPP.) S16, S19 (2007) (asserting that aligning tenure decisions with patents
“is a misuse of scholarship because it skews things in a way that misses the
opportunity for fundamental discovery”).
187. See Richard Jensen et al., The Disclosure and Licensing of University
Inventions 2, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9734, 2003)
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9734.pdf?new_window=1; see also
Thursby & Thursby, supra note 98, at 189 (discussing the failure of faculty to
disclose because of possible publication delay, time required for industry
research and development, and perceptions regarding the roles of academic
scientists and engineers).
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theorists and economists alike might persuasively contend that
motivating disclosure is a matter of demonstrating that it is
worthwhile and better than the next, best alternative, which
might be non-disclosure, circumvention, or even departure.188
Therefore, high performing, entrepreneurial universities must
make sure (1) that incentives make disclosure worthwhile and
(2) that disincentives are minimal and exist only as needed.
Successfully increasing disclosures should generate enough
quality content for universities to reliably account for their
compliance with federal policy and the expenditure of public
money.
Disclosures
can
provide
this
through
commercialization and pursuit of monetary, educational,
humanitarian, and other benefits that flow from the entrance of
quality research into the advancing innovation pipeline.
2. Measures of Success
As noted in Part II.A, universities in the United States do
not operate in a purely manufacturing economy that measures
success linearly.189 It is no longer just a matter of objective
inputs yielding predictable outputs. Unfortunately, many of the
measures associated with technology transfer from universities
have remained linear, which is unsurprising if revenue is the
primary objective.190 To evaluate advancing innovation inputs,
universities look to “income” generated by sponsored research,

188. Jensen et al., supra note 187, at 10–11; see also Strandburg, supra
note 49, at 108–09 (suggesting that disclosures occur when revenues from
patenting a discovery outweigh any opportunity costs or penalties for violating
norms).
189. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text; see also PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 1-2, 7, 31 (recognizing the changing paradigm
from a linear innovation pathway to a “dynamic ecosystem” that is non-linear,
or less linear, more complex, and iterative).
190. As Siegel and his colleagues note business places significant value on
some of the more informal paths for technology transfer. Siegel, supra note 30,
at 127; Siegel, supra note 31, at 130–131; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note
19, at 5 (discussing findings that patents and licenses are less important to
industry for knowledge exchange than other channels such as publications and
conference presentations); Libecap, supra note 27, at xi–xii (“[U]niversities
influence industrial innovation through . . . interacting informally and in
conferences with industry researchers . . . .”). It will help technology transfer
personnel build trust with faculty and researchers if they recognize the
importance of these measures and can facilitate, or at least accommodate
these opportunities to the extent possible. See supra notes 127–130 and
accompanying text.
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grant activity, and disclosures.191 To measure outputs, they
frequently seem to calculate the following:
a. number of patent applications, patents, and licenses
or assignments;
b. revenue generated from license fees, royalties,
options, and cashed in equity;
c. new products introduced to the market; and
d. number of business start-ups begun and ongoing.
Not surprisingly, the above list contains indicators that
most readily reflect that money is the goal that university
leaders have for advancing innovation.192 All of these are
relevant indicators of some level of activity and effort, and the
information should continue to be gathered and used
appropriately. However, these measures do not most accurately
reflect how universities implement federal policy or most fully
account for the expenditure of tax dollars.
Examining
disclosure figures illustrates this point.
Using only the numbers available for fiscal year 2006,
which saw about $45.4 billion in sponsored research,
universities appear to have spent approximately $2.4 million in
research per disclosure, $3.9 million per new patent
application, and $14 million per patent.193 However, it is

191. See, e.g., AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 20, 24 (reporting sponsored
research dollars and disclosures).
192. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
193. The chart below presents data available from AUTM for 2004-2006. It
also presents a financial relationship between those outputs and the amount
expended within each given year rounded to the nearest dollar.
2004
2005
2006
Disclosures
16,871
17,382
18,874
New
Patent 10,517
10,270
11,622
Applications
Patents Issued
3,680
3,278
3,255
Sponsored
Dollars

Research

Research
Spending
Per
Disclosure
(calculated)
Research
Spending
Per
New
Patent
Application
(calculated)

$41.245 billion

$42.3 billion

$45.4 billion

$2,444,728

$2,433,552

$2,405,425

$3,921,746

$4,118,793

$3,906,384
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critical to remember that these ratios at best are only
illustrative because the outputs counted in 2006 most likely
arose from research dollars expended in and aggregated over
multiple preceding years. We probably get closer to actual
ratios by calculating outputs in 2006 as a function of
expenditures in 2004 and 2005, which yields an expenditure
per disclosure ratio about twice as high as the amount based on
2006 research dollars. Accurate data is not available from
which to make reliable calculations or assessments of how
research spending correlates to the above activities. However,
the possible difference in disclosure ratios should demonstrate
how deficient and unreliable this information can be as a
purported measure of the outputs of technology transfer efforts.
Even considering the seemingly ubiquitous measure of
licensing revenue, the relationship to spending is similarly
distorted and ill-informed. Using AUTM’s 2006 reported
revenue as an example and unrealistically assuming that a
relationship exists between 2006 revenue and research
expenditures in the same year, the financial return on the
taxpayer’s investment appears to be about four percent.194
Recognizing that it is more likely that expenditures in prior
years seeded the revenues received in 2006, that return is
reduced by half if 2006 revenue is compared against aggregated
research expenditures for both 2004 and 2005.195 As a pure
financial matter, two to four percent returns are not acceptable
outputs or results.
There also is a temptation to suggest that these ratios
could support the statements at the beginning of this article
Research
Spending
Per Patent Issued
(calculated)

$11,207,880

$12,904,210

$13,947,773

AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 2, 15, 16, 18, 19; AUTM 2005, supra note 78,
at 13, 22, 26, 28; AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 5, 20, 24 25.
194. See AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 5, 20, 38–44. To arrive at this
figure, we totaled the amounts provided by the universities to AUTM for the
2006 study regarding revenue generated from their advancing innovation
efforts and divided that amount by the amount spent on research. AUTM last
provided a total on revenue in its 2004 survey. In that survey, AUTM
reported $1.385 billion in net licensing revenue and about $41.245 billion in
research expenditures. AUTM 2004, supra note 105 at 2, 3, 14, 24–25. Using
those amounts, we can calculate a “return” of about 3.35%.
195. See AUTM 2004, supra note 105, at 2, 24; AUTM 2005, supra note 78,
at 5, 22, 42–47.
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that university innovation advancement efforts generally are
not reaching their potential.196 These calculations should not,
however, be relied on except in concluding that they
demonstrate the incompleteness of current measurements and
the need for better ones. For instance, none of the traditional
indicators for assessing outputs account appropriately for
benefits in economic growth and advances in human welfare,
such as jobs created or retained, taxes paid, efficiencies gained,
lives made more comfortable, and illnesses prevented or
abated.
The University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (“UNC”)
developed a technology to be used as an adjunct to the AIDS
vaccine.197 Working through their start-up company and in
collaboration with the University of Capetown in South Africa,
UNC launched a clinical trial.198 Although there may be high
demand for the adjunct, there is little economic reward UNC
can expect.199 Using traditional measures of success, this effort
by UNC might measure a “one” in licenses granted. It is
unlikely to reach materiality in terms of revenue when
measured against the University’s annual budget. Given those
realities, some might contend that it was not worth the time,
energy, or effort to make this technology available under
traditional measurements. UNC believed otherwise. Given the
number of lives that could be improved or even saved, this
innovation could be considered a “home run” under alternative
performance measures.
To its credit, AUTM also recognizes limitations of data on
patents, disclosures and research dollars, and desires new
indicators that better assess the fruits of advancing innovation
efforts.200 John Fraser, President of AUTM when it published
196. See supra pp. 1–2.
197. Mark Crowell, The Changing Face of University Technology Transfer,
in EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION
THOUGHTBOOK 2005, at 107, 110 (2005).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 109 (“[T]raditional measures are problematic.”); id. at 110
(citing AUTM discussions about developing “more important and more
substantive measures”); Ben Butkus, Questioning Licensing Revenue As
Measure of Success, AUTM, Others Seek Alternatives, BIOTECH TRANSFER
WEEK
(December
10,
2007),
http://www.biotechtransferweek.com/issues/1_39/features/143878-1.html; see
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4, 25. 34 (“few robust
measures and quantitative asessements exist” and “more robust metrics are
needed to describe the actual inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the
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its FY2005 study, described the AUTM board’s work “to
identify additional, new metrics to measure impact and
outcomes of our activities.”201 Mr. Fraser also explained
AUTM’s interim efforts to tell more of the story by featuring
success stories in its report “to more clearly illustrate the
results—the benefits—of the tech transfer process.”202 Patrick
Jones, Ph.D., AUTM’s President upon publication of its FY2006
study, similarly reflected that “[t]he impact of technology
transfer is not in mere numbers reflecting the activities of
offices, but rather in the benefit to the public . . . .”203 Dr. Jones
continued that “these numbers are just a part of the actual
contributions from research performed . . . .”204
As discussed earlier in the context of a vision that drives
behavior, using linear standards as a primary measure of
activity can communicate how the university and its leaders
view advancing innovation and the priority, or lack thereof,
that they place on doing so.205 If advancing innovation is to
serve the overall mission of the university and fulfill federal
policy, additional measurements consistent with such an
approach should be adopted.206 Those measurements might
R&D enterprise”).
201. AUTM 2005, supra note 78, at 4.
202. Id.
203. AUTM 2006, supra note 78, at 4.
204. Id.
205. See Crowell, supra note 197, at 109–10 (explaining that a focus on
dollars, or number of patents, license agreements, and disclosures can cause
the university to lose sight of public benefit and economic benefit); Boettiger &
Bennett, supra note 10, at 273 (“The focus by universities on . . . income
generation has in part shaped the functioning of the U.S. technology transfer
in United State system.”); id. at 280 (“performance metrics based on
revenue . . . and numbers of patents and licenses, distorts decision-making
process of technology transfer TTO staff”); Markman et al., supra note 11, at
259 (stating that universities are pressured to show tangible returns to
society); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 306 (stating that technology
transfer office personnel see their primary job as bringing in licensing
revenue, and that it may be important in their performance assessment); see
also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 35 (standards to evaluate
performance of university researchers and make tenure decisions “often fail to
recognize other critical factors” because they rely primarily on publications
and Federal grants; current metrics for incentives and reward systems “lack
the flexibility to optimally support university-private sector partnerships and
innovation”).
206. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 19, at 178:
To the extent that universities choose among these instruments
carefully, and with the objective of facilitating use and
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reflect the benefits of advancing innovation efforts in service to
economic growth and human welfare, and might include the
following:
a. number of those who use innovations that emanate
from universities;
b. number of medical treatments administered;
c. number of diseases treated;
d. number of students engaged;
e. number of lives saved or improved;
f. number of jobs created or retained;
g. total economic impact,207 including sales volume,
revenue, and income and other taxes generated (and
exempted because of tax status);
h. regional economic development changes, and new
businesses that might emerge in support of the new
technology, products, or services;
i. number and quality of social networks created,
enhanced, and expanded;
j. number of new collaborations developed; and
k. amount of time involved with and total costs of
licensing.
Not all of these forms of measure will be useful or even
make sense for every innovation or university, and there
certainly are others that could be added. The point is that
there should be discussions about including less linear, nonstandardized measures that will better account for resources
commercialization rather than maximizing royalty income, patents
and licenses can advance the mission of the university-industry
technology transfer while maintaining the other important missions
of public and private universities in the United States.
See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2003, supra note 1, at 11 (Stating that metrics
to quantify program effectiveness are needed and “must take into account a
wide range of steps in a highly complex process”); MOWERY ET AL., supra note
19, at 190 (“A single-minded focus on patenting and licensing as the only
important or effective channels for technology transfer is unrealistic and may
produce policies that limit the effectiveness of other channels that are more
important . . . .”); see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL 2008, supra note 12, at 4
(advocating for metrics of technology innovation, workforce, and productivity)
and 21 (“development of new technologies and creation of human capital”).
207. See SCHACHT, 32076, supra note 2, at 16 (reporting that estimated
returns to society from investment in basic research are twice those received
by industry, and include increased revenues from taxes on profits, new jobs
created, improved productivity, and economic growth); SCHACHT, 30320, supra
note 2, at 10 (“[B]ringing new products, processes, and services to the
marketplace can generate economic growth in the form of new jobs, [and]
greater productivity . . . .”).
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and allow universities to encourage those positioned to advance
innovations. These types of indicators may even help increase
disclosures as researchers realize that their innovations have
practical effects beyond money.
Finally, technology and society have changed. What
previously might have been pursued as strictly proprietary
(consistent with the manufacturing approach), may now more
reasonably be treated as open source in certain industries and
research focus areas. Although not easily subject to the
traditional, linear standards of measure, open source, Creative
Commons, Science Commons, and other approaches to
intellectual property can be meaningful and influential. New
approaches demand additional measures of performance to
account for the impact of such advancements.
New approaches also may help delineate gains made
against the inventory of stagnant creativity mired in
laboratories, drawers, and shelves. Current standards of
measure do tell us that innovation is being advanced, but they
do not provide much information about whether potential is
being reached or whether the university, its researchers, and
society as a whole are receiving reasonably robust benefits from
the fruits of federally funded university research. There may
be a certain naiveté about this vision, but without considering
it among the benchmarks of achievement, universities will only
be able to tell whether they have increased from prior years.
Beating last year’s numbers may be progress, but it does not
mean that federal policy has been implemented or that returns
have been maximized on the tens of billions of dollars spent
each year on research.208
VI. CONCLUSION
Far too many meaningful university innovations lie
dormant and under-utilized.209 Given the amount of money
spent annually to further university research and the relatively
low levels of quantitative return,210 one can argue that this
under-utilization creates enormous waste, unrealized potential,
and even moral failure. Among these innovations may lie more
208. See, e.g., AUTM 2006 supra note 78, at 5 (“Universities received $45
billion plus in R&D expenditures . . . .”).
209. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 189–191 and accompanying text.
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effective ways to cure, treat, and prevent disease; ways to
better conserve, exploit or replenish natural resources;
technologies that allow us to better understand science; or any
number of other useful discoveries. We need sustained efforts
to advance university innovations as envisioned by federal
policy.
Some have suggested that reversing or modifying BayhDole can produce the results Congress intended.211 Such an
approach may be unworkable for practical reasons, including
the need to address the fact that various other governmental
and private sources also fund the same research and have their
own expectations. As a policy matter, it may be better to
address deficiencies elsewhere in the commercialization and
utilization processes. For instance, in light of the growing
number of 501(c)(3) organizations interested in medical and
health care advances, it might be useful to change federal
policies for some period of time to make it easier for such
organizations to invest resources at intermediate stages of
The government could also offer tax
development.212
incentives to for profit enterprises investing at that stage,
thereby bridging the current “valley of death” to “increase
economic welfare and the productivity of government R&D
Alternative treatment of investments by
investment.”213
501(c)(3) and for profit organizations in enterprises building
substantially on university innovations may serve similar
purposes. While policy makers and others consider these and
other changes, universities that have not been as successful in
advancing their innovations might pursue the suggestions in
this article and other strategies for more fully implementing
federal policy expressed in Bayh-Dole.
Institutional transformations are hard work, take time,
and involve risk. Perpetuating the status quo, however, also
carries risk, including that of denying society the benefits of an
unacceptably large quantity of university research and
innovation. The rewards for engaging this work, taking this
211. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 291 (arguing that funding
agencies have a more appropriate combination of knowledge and incentives to
decide intellectual property rights and that Bayh-Dole should be modified to
allow them to determine when to dedicate federally funded research results to
the public domain).
212. See supra notes 127, 166 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the increasing interest of private foundations and other non-profit
organizations in broadly utilizing and commercializing cures for disease.
213. Ford, supra note 17, at 36.
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time, and accepting reasonable risks can transform economic
possibilities and advance human welfare in ways we may not
even be able to imagine yet. Moreover, concerns about conflicts
of interest and commitment, and other ethical dilemmas do not
outweigh these benefits or the federal policy mandate. They
still must and can be managed in a balanced way that protects
reputations and the actual as well as perceived credibility of
research outcomes. As a result, we should expect more.
University leaders and others in academia and industry should
do more to produce and demonstrate better returns—financial
and otherwise—on the investment of taxpayer money.
This can be done by ensuring that universities operate
with a vision for advancing innovation that (i) complements the
university’s academic and research missions and (ii) is
informed by the institution’s research capacities and personnel,
and realistic expectations about revenue potential and
allocation of risk. Vision alone, however, will not produce
results. Several universities have shown that results can
follow when vision is implemented through corresponding
policies and consistent behaviors that (i) pursue variable
intellectual
property
strategies
appropriate
for
the
circumstances, (ii) properly allocate liability and risk, or
compensate in other ways for misallocations, (iii) entice and
reward researchers for their disclosures and their cooperation
with the advancing innovation process, and (iv) more fully
measure and explain the results of our nation’s investment in
university research.
These responsibilities lie first and
foremost with university leaders and their advisors, many of
whom are from the legal profession.

